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1817 
Automating Securities Class Action 
Settlements 
Jessica Erickson* 
Securities class actions are supposed to vindicate the rights of investors 
injured by corporate fraud. Yet, despite multimillion- or even multibillion-
dollar settlements, many injured investors never receive a dime in 
compensation. To receive money from a settlement in a securities class action, 
investors must comply with a cumbersome claims process, documenting their 
transactions in the defendant corporation’s stock and detailing their losses. 
Faced with this hurdle, many investors never claim their shares of the 
settlement funds. Courts continue to insist that investors comply with 
cumbersome claims processes because they do not think they have another way 
to accurately identify class members. Companies do not know who purchased 
their shares during the class period, nor has there been a global database that 
tracks securities purchases down to the level of individual shareholders. As a 
result, the only way to identify injured investors has been to require them to 
identify themselves, typically by filing a claim and documenting their 
transactions.   
This Article argues that the time has come to modernize the distribution 
of settlement funds in securities class actions. There are two possible ways to 
modernize this process. The first approach relies on market innovation, 
proposing an automated system that collects the relevant transaction data from 
individual banks and brokers. Claims administrators could then use this data 
to calculate every class member’s pro rata share of the settlement and send them 
their money. The second approach relies on regulatory innovation using the 
SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail, which, once it is up and running, will contain 
a complete record of nearly all securities transactions in the financial markets. 
The Consolidated Audit Trail will contain exactly the type of data needed to 
automate the distribution of settlement funds in securities class actions. Neither 
 
 * Professor & Associate Dean for Faculty Development, University of Richmond School of 
Law. I want to thank Matthew Cain, Jim Cox, Paul Edelman, Jill Fisch, Joel Fleming, Jonathan 
Gardner, Lawrence Hamermesh, Gregg Levin, Frank Partnoy, Darren Robbins, Amanda Rose, 
Hilary Sale, and Randall Thomas for their helpful comments and suggestions on this Article. I am 
also grateful to several claims administration companies, employees at Broadridge Financial 
Services, Inc., and current and former staff attorneys at the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission for answering my many questions as I wrote this Article. 
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of these solutions is turnkey, and both would require the cooperation of courts 
and lawmakers, but they have the potential to revolutionize how investors 
recover money lost to corporate fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Securities class actions, like nearly all class actions in the 
United States, are ostensibly opt-out lawsuits.1 Under the opt-out 
model, individuals who fall within the class definition are automatically 
members of the class unless they take affirmative steps to opt out.2 This 
model was a deliberate choice by the drafters of modern class action 
rules back in the 1960s,3 and it has been vigorously protected ever 
since.4 It is thought to breathe life into class actions by ensuring that 
individuals who do not have the financial incentive to opt into a lawsuit 
nevertheless get their day in court.5 
Yet the reality has never been this rosy. True, class members in 
securities class actions are automatically part of the litigation, but that 
does not mean that they will get any money as a result. Even if a 
securities class action ends with a multimillion-dollar settlement, 
investors do not receive any money from the settlement unless they file 
a claim as part of the settlement administration process.6 In this 
process, they must prove that they purchased the corporation’s 
securities during the class period, usually by presenting the claims 
administrator with detailed records of their relevant transactions.7  
Investors often fail to participate in the settlement process. A 
well-known empirical study published in 2005 by Professors James Cox 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities 
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 30 (2007) (“Plaintiffs in 
securities class actions generally proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”); David H. Webber, The Plight 
of the Individual Investor in Securities Class Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157, 181 (2012) 
(explaining that “[v]irtually all securities class actions are brought under [Rule 23(b)(3)]”). 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (stating that, for any federal class action certified under 
Rule 23(b)(3), notice to the class must state that “the court will exclude from the class any member 
who requests exclusion”). 
 3. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967) (explaining how the 
drafting committee reached the conclusion that it “seem[ed] fair for the silent to be considered as 
part of the class”). 
 4. See Edward H. Cooper, Federal Class Action Reform in the United States: Past and Future 
and Where Next?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 432, 439 (2002) (explaining that “[t]he Advisory Committee 
has studied several versions of an opt-in rule” with “[t]he most aggressive approach . . . to convert 
all Rule 23(b)(3) actions to opt-in classes”). 
 5. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 397–98. 
 6. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions—Claims 
Administration, 35 J. CORP. L. 123, 125 (2009) (explaining that “[m]ost class action securities cases 
are handled by claims administrators who develop claim forms”). 
 7. See, e.g., Corrected Declaration of Jeremy A. Lieberman in Support of (A) Class 
Representatives’ Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation; (B) 
Class Counsel’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation 
Expenses; and (C) Class Representatives’ Motion for Reimbursement of Costs at Ex. 2, 22–26, In 
re Petrobras Sec. Litig., No. 14-cv-9662 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2018), ECF 789-2 (presenting a 
proof of claim form).  
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and Randall Thomas found that less than one-third of large 
institutional investors actually filed claims in securities class actions.8 
The percentage is likely even smaller for less sophisticated investors.9 
This study sparked a number of changes in the claims administration 
process, including a burgeoning industry of third-party claim filers that 
assist larger institutional investors with filing their claims.10 As a 
result, the percentage of submitted claims is likely higher today. Still, 
however, no one thinks that all or nearly all shareholders receive their 
share of the settlement funds. Opt-out securities class actions are still 
opt-in, at least if investors want their money.  
No one set out to create an opt-in requirement for securities class 
actions. The complexities of the claims administration process 
developed not out of malice, but because courts do not think they have 
another way to accurately distribute settlement funds. In a securities 
class action, damages are based on the number of shares that each class 
member purchased in the defendant corporation during the class 
period, as well as the price they paid for those shares.11 There is no 
global database that tracks securities purchases down to the level of 
individual customers.12 The companies themselves do not have this 
information, nor do any of the securities intermediaries or 
clearinghouses that are involved in these transactions behind the 
scenes.13 As a result, the only way to identify class members has been 
to require them to identify themselves, typically by filing a claim and 
documenting their transactions. In short, the opt-in requirement at the 
settlement stage is a result of a critical gap in the available data.  
Yet the data now exists to automate this process. This Article 
identifies two possible ways to automate the distribution of settlement 
funds in securities class actions. The first approach relies on market 
innovation. Right now, only individual banks and brokers have records 
 
 8. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate 
in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005). 
 9. The exact percentage of retail investors who file claims is not publicly available, but as 
discussed below, several claims administrators with whom I spoke estimated that, on average, 
approximately twenty to twenty-five percent of total eligible shares file claims in a securities class 
action settlement. See discussion infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Alex Villanova, Current Claims Filing Trends in Securities Class Action Settlements, 
JD SUPRA (May 22, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/current-claims-filing-trends-in-
74704 [https://perma.cc/7ADU-B7UH] (stating that “the days of individuals printing out a claim 
form, completing the information accurately, and attaching the necessary pages of documentation 
are long gone” and “the increase in these third party filings has resulted in a huge boost in 
electronic claims filed”). 
 11. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 1421, 1428–29 (1994) (explaining how damages are calculated in securities class actions).  
 12. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 13. See infra Section I.B.2.  
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that identify transactions by particular customers in a company’s 
securities.14 Each bank and broker has data that identifies its own 
customers’ transactions, but there is no centralized database that 
collects this data.15 But claims administrators could create an 
automated system that collects the relevant information from 
individual banks and brokers. This system could then calculate every 
class member’s pro rata share of the settlement and send each one the 
appropriate amount of money. This approach would require the 
cooperation of multiple players, including courts, banks, brokers, and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, but it would not be technologically difficult to 
obtain the customer data and distribute the settlement funds.  
The second solution relies on regulatory innovation. Right now, 
there is not a centralized database that tracks all transactions in a 
given corporation’s securities. Yet the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) is on the verge of creating exactly this database. 
Spurred by a desire to shed light on the dark web and catch insider 
trading, the SEC has authorized the creation of the Consolidated Audit 
Trail, or CAT.16 Once the CAT is up and running, it will include a 
complete record of nearly all securities transactions, including 
approximately fifty-eight billion records every day of orders, executions, 
and quote life cycles for equities and options markets.17 In other words, 
the CAT will contain exactly the type of data that is needed to automate 
the distribution of settlement funds in securities class actions. The SEC 
currently places strict limitations on the use of this data,18 so it will 
almost certainly need some convincing to use the CAT data in this way. 
Doing so, however, would help fulfill the SEC’s mission of investor 
protection and would complement the agency’s own enforcement 
agenda.  
This Article argues that the legal system should explore both 
market and regulatory approaches to automating the distribution of 
settlement funds in securities class actions. The current claims 
administration process was developed at a time when the data needed 
for automation was not available. Today, however, this data is within 
reach, both through individual outreach to banks and brokers and 
through the SEC’s promised CAT database. Neither system is turnkey 
 
 14. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 15. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 16. 17 C.F.R. § 242.613 (2019). 
 17. See CAT NMS Provides Progress Update on the Consolidated Audit Trail, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 
26, 2018, 5:15 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181026005523/en/CAT-NMS-
Progress-Update-Consolidated-Audit-Trail [https://perma.cc/2YPZ-QSX3]. 
 18. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(e)(2) (providing that the SEC shall only have access to the CAT 
“for the purpose of performing its respective regulatory and oversight responsibilities pursuant to 
the federal securities laws, rules, and regulations”). 
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right now, but both have the potential to revolutionize the way that 
investors recover money lost to fraud.  
This Article focuses on securities class actions, but it has broader 
implications. Many other types of class actions face similar problems 
when it comes to distributing settlement funds.19 The problems in 
securities class actions are particularly well documented, which makes 
these lawsuits an obvious starting point in any effort to reform the 
distribution of settlement funds. Yet, in a world of increasing data 
sophistication, it may be possible to use similar measures to automate 
the distribution of settlement funds in other types of aggregate 
litigation as well. This Article is therefore intended to spur a broader 
conversation about modernizing this stage of the litigation process.   
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will explore the 
opt-out promise of securities class actions, along with the opt-in reality 
of the claims administration process. Part II will describe market and 
regulatory solutions to the problem of distributing settlement funds in 
these suits, explaining how private companies and the SEC have access 
to the data needed to automate this process. Part III will explore the 
possible repercussions of automating this process. Although automation 
will lead to greater compensation for most investors, it could also 
present unexpected consequences and risks.  
I. THE OPT-IN REQUIREMENT IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
The opt-out model of class actions is a distinctly American 
invention.20 In the United States, it is common for class members to 
have their rights vindicated in court, even if they do not know they are 
members of the class or anything else about the litigation. This Part 
examines the promise of this opt-out model, before turning to the opt-
 
 19. In most types of class actions and even in SEC Fair Funds distributions, courts use a 
claims administration process to create a list of class members and to calculate the amount of their 
individual claims. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues 
in Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 54–60 (2008) (describing two large 
consumer class actions and the complicated means to identify potential claimants); Rhonda 
Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 103 (2014) (“[I]n some class 
actions, a significant number of absent class members’ identities are not known and it is impossible 
to provide them with individual notice of the opportunity to file a claim.”). In other types of class 
actions, however, it is relatively easy to identify and communicate with the class. In a class action 
filed on behalf of current and former employees for unpaid wages, for example, the defendant will 
have records for these employees, including their dates of employment and salary information. 
Armed with this information, it would not be difficult for the claims administrator to calculate 
each class member’s share of the settlement. 
 20. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 293 (2010) (explaining that “outside of the United States,” lawmakers “remain 
reluctant to buy into ‘entrepreneurial litigation’ and continue to search for intermediate options 
that stop short of adopting either the contingent fee or the opt-out class action”). 
Erickson_PAGE 11/16/2019 11:59 AM 
2019] AUTOMATING SECURITIES CLASS SETTLEMENTS 1823 
in reality of securities class actions. It will then discuss the data 
challenges that upended the original participatory vision of these 
lawsuits.  
A. The Opt-Out Promise 
To understand the opt-in reality of securities class actions, one 
must first understand their promise. Securities class actions are 
controlled by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, just like 
nearly all class actions in the federal courts. Congress has passed 
legislation, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”), that overrides Rule 23 in certain limited ways,21 but 
procedurally speaking, securities class actions are still largely a 
creature of Rule 23. Accordingly, this discussion focuses on the history 
and goals of this rule, interspersed with specific quirks of securities law 
and practice where relevant. 
The modern version of Rule 23 is a child of the 1960s, and it 
reflects the hope and optimism of the era. The original version of Rule 
23 was based on traditional rules of equity and included few of the 
procedural complexities of the modern version.22 By the mid-1960s, 
however, class actions began to grow in popularity, especially in the 
civil rights area, and lawyers and judges alike began to recognize the 
need for greater clarity and guidance in this area of law. In 1966, the 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee of the United States Judicial 
Conference decided to completely overhaul the rule, ultimately creating 
the three types of class actions currently laid out in Rule 23(b).23  
The type of class action most common today—the Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action—was created as part of this overhaul. This subsection 
permits a federal court to certify a class if two requirements are met—
(1) questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members and (2) a class action 
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.24 This category of class action is notable 
because it expressly permits class representatives to bind absent class 
 
 21. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) (permitting the court to award “reasonable attorney’s 
fees”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6) (2012) (limiting fees to a “reasonable percentage of the amount 
of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class”).  
 22. See, e.g., John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 
706–07 (1997) (quoting the original version of Rule 23 and explaining the three types of class 
actions permitted under the rule). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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members.25 As a result, someone who falls within the definition of the 
class is automatically a member of the class—and thus bound by any 
judgment in the proceeding—unless she affirmatively takes steps to opt 
out.  
In debating the contours of what ultimately became Rule 
23(b)(3), the committee considered an opt-in model, but ultimately 
rejected it. An opt-out model, they believed, would avoid “freezing out 
the claims of people—especially small claims held by small people—who 
for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with 
business or legal matters, will simply not take the affirmative step” to 
opt into the class action.26 The committee believed that this approach 
would help ensure that “the silent [would] be considered as part of the 
class.”27 This subsection is now the dominant means through which 
class actions are certified, such that “the world of class actions . . . [is] 
primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions.”28  
The decision to adopt an opt-out model of class actions has 
implications for silent class members, including those who may not even 
be aware that they are part of the class. On the plus side, they are 
automatically eligible to receive their pro rata share of any proceeds 
paid out as part of a judgment or settlement, assuming they do not opt 
out of the litigation. On the other hand, they are also automatically 
bound by the judgment and therefore precluded from later filing their 
own suit if they do not think their interests were well represented in 
the class action.29 In this way, Rule 23(b)(3) represents a quid pro quo. 
Absent class members are entitled to their share of the litigation 
proceeds, but they also surrender their individual claims against the 
defendants.  
The opt-out model for class actions reflects a goal of full 
participation, especially for small claimants who do not have the 
economic incentive to affirmatively opt into litigation. As we shall see, 
however, the opt-out model does not fulfill its promise. Indeed, when it 
 
 25. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997) (“Rule 23(b)(3) was the most 
adventuresome innovation of the 1966 Amendments, permitting judgments for money that would 
bind all class members save those who opt out.”). 
 26. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 398. That said, the opt-out model was not the result of careful 
reflection by the advisory committee in 1966. Instead, it emerged as a “moment of inspiration,” 
with the committee members having “not the slightest idea what it would become,” given the 
relatively small number of class actions at that time. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 432. 
 27. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 398. 
 28. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR 
PRIVATE GAIN 52 (2000); see also Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 863 
(2014) (“Due in large part to the creativity of the plaintiffs’ bar with regard to the aggregated-
damages subtype, the other subtypes now represent a minority of class actions.”).  
 29. See Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 
62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 206 (2009). 
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comes to the final step of paying individual members, securities class 
actions follow an approach that is functionally equivalent to the opt-in 
model that the rules drafters long ago rejected.  
B. The Opt-In Reality 
In practice, securities class actions, like nearly all class actions 
in the United States, are opt-in lawsuits, at least when it comes to 
compensating class members. For class members to receive their share 
of any settlement proceeds, they must typically complete claim forms 
and submit them online, a process that relatively few class members 
complete. As a result, many class members never receive any direct 
monetary benefit from being part of the class. This Section explains the 
practical hurdles in distributing settlement proceeds in securities class 
actions, before turning to the data challenges that have created these 
hurdles.  
1. Claims Administration Hurdles 
a. The Traditional Claims Administration Process 
 In securities class actions, settlements follow a fairly 
predictable pattern. Once the parties get close to finalizing the 
settlement agreement,30 plaintiffs’ counsel will start working with a 
claims administrator and an economic expert to draft a proposed plan 
of allocation, which lays out the methodology that the claims 
administrator will use to determine each class member’s compensable 
damages.31 The plan of allocation is typically based on damage analyses 
developed by the economic expert using an event study to measure the 
impact of the alleged fraud on the price of the securities at various 
points during the class period.32 Once the settlement agreement and 
 
 30. The settlement agreement specifies the amount of the settlement, the parties to the 
settlement, and the class period, among other terms. It typically does not include the plan of 
allocation, and indeed many settlement agreements specify that the terms of the plan of allocation 
are not necessary terms of the settlement and alteration of the plan by the court is not grounds for 
terminating the settlement. See, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement at 19, Robb v. 
Fitbit, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00151-SI (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018).  
 31. See Stevie Thurin, A Guide to Settlement Plans of Allocation in Securities Class Actions, 
A.B.A. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/ 
articles/2018/fall2018-a-guide-to-settlement-plans-of-allocation-securities-class-actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7MT-UMM6]. This proposed plan of allocation is typically included in a 
separate document intended for distribution to class members, rather than in the settlement 
agreement itself. See id. 
 32. See id. 
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plan of allocation are finalized, plaintiffs’ counsel presents both 
documents to the court for preliminary approval.33  
Following preliminary approval of the settlement, the claims 
administrator’s next major task is to notify class members.34 As 
discussed below,35 claims administrators do not have a list of class 
members, so they must use indirect means to contact them.36 Typically, 
firms will send notice of the settlements and the accompanying claim 
forms to banks and brokers across the country.37 The banks and brokers 
are then supposed to pass along these notices to their investor clients, 
who must complete the claim forms and return them to the claims 
administrators to receive their share of the settlement proceeds.38 
The claim forms are complicated for even the most sophisticated 
investors. Resembling tax forms, they can be ten or more pages, with 
detailed instructions requiring the claimant to list all of her 
transactions in the relevant securities during the class period, along 
with the dates and purchase or sale price.39 If the claimant purchased 
both common and preferred stock in the issuer, or purchased stock in 
both the primary and secondary markets, she may have to list those 
transactions separately.40 She must also attach documentation of all 
listed transactions.41 Finally, the forms often require a claimant to 
 
 33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class . . . may be 
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.632 (2004) (“Review of a proposed class action settlement 
generally involves two hearings. First, counsel submit the proposed terms of settlement and the 
judge makes a preliminary fairness evaluation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 34. See, e.g., Declaration of Josephine Bravata Concerning Mailing of Notice of Pendency & 
Settlement of Class Action & Proof of Claim & Release para. 3–4, Fitzpatrick v. Uni-Pixel, Inc., 
No. 4:13-cv-01649 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2015) (outlining the claim administration process for 
identifying class members, providing them with information about the settlement, and confirming 
their claims); Affidavit of Michelle M. La Count, Esq., In Support of Lead Plaintiffs’ Unopposed 
Motion to Authorize Distribution of Net Settlement Fund para. 5–8, In re Take-Two Interactive 
Sec. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-00803-RJS (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2011) (same). 
 35. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 36. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 419 (“Because of the way in which stocks are both 
owned and traded, the claims administrator faces multiple challenges in assuring that potential 
claimants in fact receive notice of the settlement.”). 
 37. See id.  
 38. See id. at 419–20. Alternatively, banks and brokers can themselves send the claim forms 
to any of their customers who may be eligible to file a claim. See Villanova, supra note 10. 
Additionally, as discussed below, third-party filers often simply send the claims administrators a 
spreadsheet of their clients’ claims. See discussion infra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 39. For a representative claim form, see Proof of Claim and Release Form, GTAT SEC. LITIG. 
(2018), http://www.gtatsecuritieslitigation.com/docs/POC.pdf [https://perma.cc/982F-X77J]. This 
form is sixteen pages long with seventeen paragraphs of “general instructions,” plus additional 
specific instructions on each subsequent page. 
 40. See, e.g., id. at 6–13 (providing space to list transactions in the issuer’s common stock, 
convertible senior notes, call options, and put options).  
 41. See, e.g., id. at 3:  
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certify, upon penalty of perjury, that (1) she read and understood the 
entire contents of the settlement notice and claim form and that (2) she 
is in fact a member of the settlement class.42  
Once the claims administrator receives these claims, it must 
calculate each class member’s compensable loss. These calculations are 
typically done in-house by the claims administrator based on the plan 
of allocation approved by the court.43 The claims administrator audits a 
certain percentage of the claims and then pays those who submitted 
valid claims their pro rata share of the settlement.44 
b. Problems with the Claims Administration Process 
The claims administration system is far from perfect. In a 
landmark study published in 2005, Professors James Cox and Randall 
Thomas detailed the failings of the traditional claims administration 
process, even with respect to the most sophisticated institutional 
investors.45 Using a list of 118 securities class actions, they first 
identified institutions that traded stock in the target companies during 
the class period.46 They then worked with three claims administration 
firms to identify whether these investors submitted claims as part of 
the settlement.47 They found that only twenty-eight percent of the 
institutions filed claims, despite an average mean loss of nearly 
$850,000 and an average potential recovery of approximately 
$280,000.48 They concluded that “financial institutions with significant 
 
You are required to submit genuine and sufficient documentation for all of your 
transactions in and holdings of the applicable GTAT Securities set forth in the 
Schedules of Transactions in Part III to VI of this Claim Form. Documentation may 
consist of copies of brokerage confirmation slips or monthly brokerage account 
statements, or an authorized statement from your broker containing the transactional 
and holding information found in a broker confirmation slip or account statement. 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 4: 
By submitting a signed Claim Form, you will be swearing to the truth of the statements 
contained therein and the genuineness of the documents attached thereto, subject to 
penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America. The making of false 
statements, or the submission of forged or fraudulent documentation, will result in the 
rejection of your claim and may subject you to civil liability or criminal prosecution. 
 43. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  
 44. See, e.g., The Role of the Claims Administrator in Securities Class Action Settlements, 
BATTEA CLASS ACTION SERVS. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.battea.com/role-claims-administrator-
securities-class-action-settlements [https://perma.cc/WN6M-LS76] (“During these steps, there are 
a number of audits and data integrity checks that are performed by the Claims Administrator. If 
there are any issues on a claim, the administrator can and will reject a claim entirely or partially.”). 
 45. Cox & Thomas, supra note 8. 
 46. Id. at 421. 
 47. Id. at 420–21.  
 48. Id. at 421–24 tbl. 1, 424–25.  
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provable losses fail at an alarming rate (approximately seventy percent) 
to submit their claims in settled securities class actions.”49  
As surprising as the Cox and Thomas study was, the percentage 
of total class members who submit claims is likely even smaller. In their 
study, Professors Cox and Thomas focused on institutional investors 
who had to disclose their holdings on SEC Form 13F.50 This form only 
covers investment managers who exercise investment discretion with 
respect to accounts having an aggregate fair market value of at least 
$100 million.51 In other words, the Cox and Thomas study only included 
large investment managers because they are the only investors who 
have to file Form 13F. There is no data on the percentage of smaller 
investors who file claims in securities class actions. It is fair to assume, 
however, that they are even less likely to navigate the complexities of 
the claims administration process than their larger, more sophisticated 
counterparts.52  
Why do sophisticated institutional investors leave settlement 
money on the table? Professors Cox and Thomas surveyed investors and 
found that many of them had no idea that they were failing to collect 
their share of settlement funds. Many assumed that their bank or 
broker handled this task.53 Others did not have a designated in-house 
person responsible for overseeing the claims process, and even if they 
did, the forms were not always forwarded to this person.54 And they 
often did not think the amounts at stake were worth the internal 
monitoring and oversight costs.55 These institutions were focused on 
managing their investment funds, and the bureaucratic task of 
submitting claims in securities class actions was just not on their radar.  
For smaller, retail investors, the problems are likely similar, 
although there is no research available on this side of the process. Retail 
investors may view the claim forms they receive in the mail as the legal 
equivalent of junk mail, and they may be skeptical that they really 
 
 49. Id. at 425.  
 50. Id. at 421. 
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(a)(1) (2019). 
 52. Cf. Coffee, supra note 20, at 304 (stating that “the same apathy that confounds the opt-
in class action at the outset also arises at the back end of the opt-out class action when claims 
must be filed”). 
 53. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 432 (“This oversight might also be due to a failure of 
the institution to clearly specify in its contract with its custodian, advisor, or broker the procedures 
to be followed with respect to handling possible claims.”). 
 54. See id. (“One can imagine that institutions or custodians could assign to one of their 
staffers responsibility for handling all matters related to the institution’s possible securities 
claims. This obligation is not likely to be either the sole or primary obligation of the employee.”). 
 55. See id. at 438 (“[T]hey view securities litigation as simply taking money from one pocket 
(as owners) and putting it into another pocket (as victims) while paying a percentage of it to the 
lawyers.”). 
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could receive money by going through a cumbersome claims process. 
Additionally, they may not be able to track down their trading records 
from years past, or even if they can, they may not want to go through 
the effort without any sense of how much money they stand to receive 
in the settlement.  
The Cox and Thomas study sparked a number of changes in the 
claims administration industry. In the years after the study was 
published, for example, a robust industry of third-party claims filers 
emerged, with companies such as Battea, FRT Services, and Securities 
Class Action Services (which is owned by Institutional Shareholder 
Services) offering to file claims on behalf of institutional investors.56 
Today, these third parties file many, if not most, of the claims in 
securities class actions,57 and claims administrators often let them use 
a streamlined filing process.58 In exchange for filing these claims, the 
third-party filers receive a portion of any recovery that their clients 
receive from the settlement, perhaps around thirty percent.59  
It is difficult to know precisely how the rise of third-party filers 
has impacted the claims rates in securities class actions. There have not 
been any follow-up studies to the Cox and Thomas study, and even 
anecdotal evidence is thin. In 2015, for example, a well-known 
plaintiffs’ law firm stated that only an estimated thirty-five percent of 
eligible institutional investors file claims in U.S. securities class 
 
 56. See The Role of the Claims Administrator in Securities Class Action Settlements, supra 
note 44 (detailing the firm’s securities class action recovery services); Securities Class Action 
Services, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVS. INC., https://www.issgovernance.com/securities-
class-action-services/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/G7JT-792W] (detailing the firm’s 
Securities Class Action Services solution). 
 57. See, e.g., Alex Villanova, Current Claims Filing Trends in Securities Class Actions, EPIQ 
ANGLE (May 22, 2018), https://www.epiqglobal.com/en-us/thinking/blog/trends-in-securities-class-
action-settlements [https://perma.cc/4696-TA68] (highlighting both the surge in the number of 
class action lawsuits filed in 2017 as well as the decrease in settlement value). There is not official 
data available on the percentage of claims filed by these third-party filers. During my 
conversations with claims administrators, however, several of them informally pulled up 
information on their computers regarding recent settlements that they had handled and went 
through who had filed the claims. The majority were filed on behalf of an institution by either a 
company such as Battea or ISS or a plaintiffs’ law firm.  
 58. In my conversations with claims administrators, they stated that these third-party filers 
typically do not file traditional claims with completed claim forms and supporting documentation 
for their clients. Instead, they send the claims administration a spreadsheet of transaction data 
relevant to their clients’ claims, and the claims administrator conducts random audits to help 
ensure the accuracy of this information. The investors that use these services therefore often do 
not have to go through their old files to track down confirmation of their transactions unless their 
claims are audited, unlike class members who file claims directly. 
 59. The exact percentage that these third-party filers charge is not publicly available. In my 
conversations with claims administrators, they estimated that these companies charge thirty 
percent of their client’s recovery.  
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actions, but it did not outline the empirical support for this claim.60 
Similarly, in my conversations with claims administrators, several told 
me that they price their services on the assumption that approximately 
twenty to twenty-five percent of claim forms will be returned, although 
they also said that the actual percentage can vary significantly in 
individual cases. Yet this number does not mean that only twenty to 
twenty-five percent of eligible shares file claims. There are many 
reasons why the actual claims rate may be higher than this percentage 
suggests. Claims administrators may want to maximize the number of 
filed claims, for example, and therefore may decide to send out duplicate 
forms to banks and their clients, even though only one claim can 
ultimately be filed for each class member. Additionally, the class is 
often defined broadly to include everyone who bought or sold the 
company’s shares during the class period.61 Yet, many shareholders 
who meet this definition may not have suffered a recognizable loss and 
therefore are not entitled to a share of the settlement.62 These 
shareholders have no need to return the claim forms. In short, we 
simply do not know the percentage of class members who receive their 
share of settlement funds.  
Whatever the exact percentage, however, it is clear that the Cox 
and Thomas study did not solve the problem. Most retail investors still 
lack the financial incentives to navigate the claims administration 
process, nor do they have enough money at stake to seek out the help of 
third-party claims filers.63 Larger institutional investors have more at 
stake, but many of the institutional barriers that kept them from filing 
claims in the Cox and Thomas study still exist. Some institutions have 
 
 60. See 10 Years Removed from Cox & Thomas: A Survey of the Claims Filing Landscape for 
U.S. and Non-U.S. Securities Litigation Recoveries, KESSLER TOPAZ MELTZER CHECK LLP (Nov. 5, 
2015), https://www.ktmc.com/news/10-years-removed-from-cox-thomas-a-survey [https:// 
perma.cc/9W9L-G6AQ] (providing an overview of current trends in claims administration and the 
institutional investors’ responses). 
 61. See, e.g., Amended Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws 
para. 1, Kanefsky v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 2:18-15536 (WJM) (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2019), 2019 WL 
3000264 (defining the class to include “all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Honeywell 
securities from February 9, 2018 through October 19, 2018”). 
 62. See, e.g., Notice of Plaintiffs’ Motion (1) for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Settlement, 
(2) for Approval of the Form & Manner of Notice, & (3) to Schedule a Hearing on Final Approval 
of the Settlement & on Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Application for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees & 
Expenses at Ex. A (Proposed Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement, Directing Notice to Class 
Members, & Settling Hearing for Final Approval of Settlement), In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 
04-cv-9866 (LTS)(HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2016), ECF No. 698-1 (laying out a proposed plan of 
allocation for the settlement funds based on each claimants’ recognizable losses). 
 63. There is not specific data available on this point, but the fundamental incentives 
identified in their study remain unchanged.  
Erickson_PAGE 11/16/2019 11:59 AM 
2019] AUTOMATING SECURITIES CLASS SETTLEMENTS 1831 
addressed these barriers by hiring third-party claims filers,64 but these 
companies receive a percentage of the recovery in exchange for filing 
these claims.65 As a result, investors lose a significant portion of their 
recovery by relying on these intermediaries.  
This reality complicates the oft-told story about class actions. 
Recall the advisory committee’s hope that the opt-out model in Rule 
23(b)(3) would allow “the silent to be considered as part of the class” to 
avoid “freezing out the claims of people—especially small claims held 
by small people—who . . . will simply not take the affirmative step” to 
opt into the class action.66 It is fair to ask whether this hope has 
survived the realities of complex claims administration. True, 
shareholders do not have to affirmatively opt into the class action to be 
considered a member of the class. They must, however, opt in at the 
settlement stage to receive any benefit whatsoever from the class 
action.  
Ironically, class members face the drawbacks of the opt-out 
model regardless of whether they file a claim. The preclusive effect of 
the class action—that is, the release of liability laid out in the 
settlement agreement, coupled with claim preclusion from the 
judgment itself—applies regardless of whether class members file a 
claim or receive any money.67 Class members can always opt out of the 
class,68 but if they do nothing and thus remain a part of the class, they 
are bound by the judgment and cannot later file their own lawsuit. In 
other words, the only part of a class action that is truly opt out is the 
release that class members give to the defendants. Any benefit for the 
class members is available only to those who opt in at the settlement 
phase. To be fair, class members who do not claim their share of the 
settlement are unlikely to want to file their own lawsuit later. 
Nonetheless, it is striking that class members give up something simply 
by being part of the class, but they must jump through administrative 
hoops to receive any benefit.  
 
 64. See Villanova, supra note 10 (characterizing 2017 trends in securities class action 
lawsuits, including the rise in third-party filers). 
 65. See Edward Radetich, Avoiding Risks with Third-Party Claims Filers, HEFFLER CLAIMS 
GRP. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.hefflerclaims.com/securities-posts/avoiding-risks-with-third-
party-claims-filers/ [https://perma.cc/UTR8-X9K4] (“Once the distribution occurs, third-party 
filers receive a percentage of their clients’ reward.”). 
 66. See Kaplan, supra note 3, at 398. 
 67. See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455.5 (3d ed. 2019) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; Julia C. Kou, 
Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 
286 (1998) (“Even class members who do not file claims but who do not opt out will be barred from 
pursuing claims after a class claim is concluded.”). 
 68. See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 67 § 4455 (stating that “class members who 
properly avail themselves of an opportunity to ‘opt out’ of the class action likewise are not bound”). 
Erickson_PAGE 11/16/2019 11:59 AM 
1832 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1817 
2. The Data Problem Behind These Hurdles 
None of this is motivated by malice. No one set out to deprive 
class members of their share of settlement funds, nor did anyone 
purposefully make it harder for class members to claim their money. 
The hurdles of the claims administration process exist because 
requiring class members to file a claim is often the only way that that 
courts can identify class members and determine the amount of their 
claims. This Section first describes the specific information that claims 
administrators need to distribute settlement funds in a securities class 
action, before turning to the information available to various players in 
the securities markets.  
a. Calculating Damages in Securities Class Actions 
To accurately distribute settlement funds in a securities class 
action, claims administrators need certain information about the 
damages suffered by individual class members. Damages in a securities 
class action are based on, among other things, the difference between 
the price that an investor paid for the corporation’s stock and the value 
of this stock had the corporation not lied to the market.69 To pay class 
members their share of a settlement fund, claims administrators 
therefore need three specific pieces of information. First, they need to 
know the number of shares that class members purchased during the 
class period. Second, they need to know the date on which these 
transactions occurred. Third, they need to know the price at which these 
transactions occurred.70 The claims administrator can then plug this 
information into its damages model and determine each class member’s 
individual damages.  
In nearly all securities class action settlements, however, the 
settlement fund is far smaller than the total amount of investor losses.71 
As a result, the claims administrator cannot simply send all class 
members, or even all claimants, the full amount of their calculated loss. 
The claims administrator instead needs to calculate the total value of 
 
 69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2012) (limiting recoverable damages to the difference between 
the sale price of the security and the security’s mean price over a ninety-day period following the 
disclosure of the information). 
 70. See id.  
 71. Cf. Stefan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action 
Litigation: 2018 Full-Year Review, NERA ECON. CONSULTING 34–35 (Jan. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2019/PUB_Year_End_Trends_012819_Fina
l.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5VR-79LD] (finding that, from 1996 to 2018, “the ratio of settlement to 
Investor Loss for the median case was 19.4% for cases with Investor Losses of less than $20 million, 
while it was 0.7% for cases with Investor Losses over $10 billion”). 
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the claims and then determine the pro rata share of the settlement fund 
that each class member should receive. Only after finishing these 
calculations can the claims administrator send claimants their share of 
the settlement fund. To complete this final step, the claims 
administrator needs to know either the account number where the 
funds can be electronically deposited or the class member’s physical 
address where a check can be sent.  
Putting these steps together, in order to calculate and distribute 
each class member’s share of the settlement fund, the claims 
administrator needs to know the following pieces of information: (1) the 
number of shares in the defendant corporation that each class member 
bought or sold during the class period, (2) the dates of these 
transactions, (3) the relevant sale or purchase prices, and (4) the class 
members’ contact information. As we shall see, however, this 
information is not housed in a single, easily accessible place.  
b. Information Available to Corporations 
Corporations have far less information about their shareholders 
than one might guess. It is easy to imagine that public corporations 
have a list of their shareholders tucked in a drawer, and state law 
indeed requires corporations to have a version of such a list.72 These 
lists, however, only include the names of registered shareholders, and 
typically a trust company called Cede and Company (“CEDE”) is listed 
as the registered owner of nearly all of the corporation’s shares.73 These 
lists are not helpful to claims administrators who need to identify a 
corporation’s beneficial shareholders because only beneficial 
shareholders are class members in a securities class action. 
Corporations are entitled to obtain additional information about 
their shareholders, but even this information does not provide all of the 
details that claims administrators need. To understand these 
challenges, one must recognize that most investors manage their 
investments with the assistance of a bank or broker who places trades 
on the investor’s behalf. Banks and brokers place these trades with the 
assistance of a company called the Depository Trust and Clearing 
Corporation (“DTCC”). DTCC functions as the clearinghouse to fifty 
 
 72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(1) (2019) (noting stockholders’ right to “inspect” 
such a list). 
 73. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 419 (“[B]ecause most investors hold their securities 
in street names, the list, in most instances, reports that ownership is with CEDE & Co., the 
depository for most brokers.”); see also David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The Problem at the 
Core of the U.S. Proxy System and Its Solution, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 41, 44 (2011) (stating that 
“corporation law defines a shareholder as someone who is registered on the stockholders list, not 
a person who has title to shares” (footnote omitted)). 
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exchanges and exchange-type platforms in the United States, including 
the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.74 Together, DTCC and 
its affiliates facilitate nearly every trade for every public company in 
the United States.75 
Corporations are only entitled to receive limited information 
from DTCC about their shareholders. Specifically, corporations can 
request the so-called CEDE list, which identifies the banks and brokers 
on whose behalf CEDE holds shares. This list, however, does not 
provide the names of beneficial owners or their individual transaction 
data. Companies can also get the names of certain beneficial owners 
who do not object to their names being shared, but companies are 
strictly limited in how they can use this information.76 The so-called 
NOBO list (that is, a list of non-objecting beneficial owners) also only 
captures beneficial owners at a particular moment in time.77 It does not 
provide a complete record of these owners’ purchases and sales of the 
company’s stock, which is the information needed to determine their 
pro rata share of a settlement fund. In short, corporations have access 
to some limited information about their shareholders, but it is not the 
specific information needed to calculate and distribute settlement 
funds.  
c. Information Available to Securities Intermediaries 
Claims administrators also cannot access this information 
directly from DTCC or other securities intermediaries. To understand 
why this is not possible, it is necessary to delve into the precise role that 
DTCC plays in clearing securities transactions. DTCC’s role as a central 
 
 74. DTCC is the holding company for a network of subsidiaries, many of whom play a role in 
the processes detailed in this Section. See About DTCC, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/about (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZP38-GSW9]. I use the term DTCC to refer to both the 
holding company and its subsidiaries. 
 75. See, e.g., Yuliya Guseva, Destructive Collectivism: Dodd-Frank Coordination and 
Clearinghouses, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1736 (2016) (noting that DTCC has a functional 
monopoly because the “smaller clearing agencies and depositories [have] gradually perished”); 
Clearing Services, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/clearing-services (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/7HUW-GS69] (“DTCC clears and settles virtually all broker-to-broker equity, 
listed corporate and municipal bond and unit investment trust (UIT) transactions in the U.S. 
equities markets.”).  
 76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(3)(i) (2019) (stating that brokers or dealers shall “provide the 
registrant, upon the registrant’s request, with the names, addresses, and security positions . . . of 
its customers who are beneficial owners of the registrant’s securities and who have not objected to 
disclosure of such information”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13(b)(4) (2019) (stating that 
registrants seeking this information regarding beneficial owners must “use the 
information . . . exclusively for purposes of corporate communications”). 
 77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(3)(i) (noting that the information is “compiled as of a date 
specified in the registrant’s request which is no earlier than five business days after the date the 
registrant’s request is received”).  
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clearinghouse makes it significantly easier for banks and brokers to 
clear their trades—in other words, to transfer the purchase price and 
net the various trades with each other. Imagine, for example, that 
broker A has a client who wants to buy fifty shares of a company’s stock, 
and broker B has a client who wants to sell these same shares. DTCC, 
through a subsidiary, ensures that the money gets from broker A to 
broker B.  
These records, however, only identify the banks and brokers that 
authorized the trades.78 DTCC and its subsidiaries do not know the 
identity of the individual customers on whose behalf the trades are 
made.79 It is up to individual banks and brokers to ensure that the 
relevant customer accounts are credited or debited the correct amount. 
DTCC simply allocates shares at the broker level. While data from 
clearinghouses like DTCC is therefore more specific than the 
information available on corporations’ shareholder lists, it still does not 
provide the level of detail needed to distribute settlement funds.80  
Data on individual customer accounts lives in only one place—
within the records of the individual banks and brokers who manage 
these accounts.81 Banks and brokers have all of the data that claims 
administrators need, including customers’ names, addresses, account 
numbers, and the date and price of the customers’ specific transactions 
in the relevant securities. The problem is that there are hundreds of 
banks and brokers across the country and no centralized database that 
contains all of their customer data.82 This fact explains why claims 
administrators typically start the claims administration process by 
 
 78. Joseph A. Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, 
and Prospects for Regulatory Reform, 41 J. CORP. L. 1, 14–15 (2015) (“The participants in the 
process only know the name of the broker, bank, or other ‘street’ entity at which the account is 
being held.”). 
 79. See FAQS: How Issuers Work with DTC, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlement-and-
asset-services/issuer-services/how-issuers-work-with-dtc (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/WE2V-W8KT] (“DTC does NOT have beneficial owner information. Issuers need 
to coordinate through DTC for communications to DTC participants and these financial 
institutions are responsible to pass along communications to their customers who may be ultimate 
beneficial owners.”). 
 80. To understand this point, imagine that one of broker A’s customers bought stock in the 
defendant corporation, while another of broker A’s customers sold this same amount. From DTCC’s 
perspective, the transaction is a wash and it does not need to do anything. The broker can simply 
transfer the shares from one of its clients to the other, and DTCC does not need to be involved. Yet 
one of these customers has been hurt by the fraud—likely the customer who purchased stock at an 
inflated price during the class price. Relying just on DTCC’s records would not reveal this injury.  
 81. Grundfest, supra note 78, at 15 (“Only the broker, bank, or other street entity knows the 
name of the beneficial owner who actually owns the shares represented by the street name 
account.”).  
 82. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster & Marcel T. Rosner, Distributed Stock Ledgers and Delaware 
Law, 73 BUS. LAW. 319, 326 (2018) (“Over 800 custodial banks and brokers are participating 
members of DTC and maintain accounts with that institution.”). 
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sending information about the settlements, along with copies of the 
relevant claim forms, to banks and brokers, requesting that the banks 
and brokers then pass these forms along to their customers.83 If the 
banks and brokers do not pass along the information, if they pass along 
the wrong information, or if customers mistakenly think that the broker 
is handling the claims process, these customers will never receive their 
share of the settlement.  
In summary, claims administrators do not have direct access to 
information about securities transactions at the beneficial owner level, 
which is the level that matters in securities class action settlements. 
Corporations only have lists of their registered owners and non-
objecting beneficial owners, and even this data is only for particular 
moments in time. DTCC only has data at the broker level. Additionally, 
the data from specific banks and brokers is dispersed among hundreds 
of proprietary databases around the country, and banks and brokers 
are under no obligation to pass this data along to claims administrators. 
This complicated structure of securities ownership goes a long way 
toward explaining the low claims rate set out in the prior Section.  
C. The Drawbacks of an Opt-In Reality 
Before turning to possible ways to fix this system, it is worth 
asking whether it needs fixing. Does it matter if most shareholders do 
not receive the settlement money to which they are entitled? In some 
ways, this may feel like an odd question. Of course, it matters if people 
do not get money to which they have a legal entitlement. Yet the 
analysis becomes more complicated when reflecting on the goals of 
securities class actions.  
It is widely recognized that securities class actions have two 
primary goals: (1) deterring corporate fraud and (2) compensating 
injured investors.84 A better method of distributing settlement funds 
would not significantly impact the goal of deterrence because the 
defendants pay the same amount regardless of how this amount is 
distributed. Even with the low claims rate in securities class actions, 
shareholders still claim more than one hundred percent of the 
settlement fund, so there is typically no amount left unclaimed.85 Given 
 
 83. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 84. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and 
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006) (recognizing compensation and 
deterrence as the traditional justifications for securities class actions, but arguing that 
“compensation [is] unobtainable and deterrence [is] deeply compromised by a variety of 
inconsistent legal doctrines that pull the punch of private enforcement”). 
 85. Even if the amount of the claims was less than the settlement amount, the defendant 
would still not get any portion of the settlement amount back because most settlement agreements 
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that defendants do not get any money back, they should not care how 
settlement funds are distributed, nor should the distribution method 
influence the behavior of corporate managers more generally.  
Instead, the way in which settlement funds are distributed 
primarily impacts the compensatory goal of securities class actions. 
Under the current system, the settlement fund is shared among a small 
group of class members, while the rest receive nothing at all. This 
imbalance could be substantial. Imagine a settlement of $50 million in 
which the total alleged damages of the class are $500 million. On paper, 
each class member should recover ten percent of the alleged damages. 
If, however, class members owning only thirty percent of the relevant 
shares file claims, this group of shareholders with a total of $150 million 
in alleged damages will share a settlement fund of $50 million, each 
receiving thirty-three percent of the alleged damages. In other words, 
members of the group that files claims will receive far more money than 
they would if the settlement fund was distributed among all class 
members. The remaining class members would receive nothing. In this 
way, the current distribution method significantly overcompensates 
some shareholders and significantly undercompensates others. 
Some scholars have argued that this imbalance does not really 
matter.86 Fifty million dollars may sound like a lot of money, but it is 
actually a drop in the bucket for most institutional investors. 
Institutional investors typically aggregate the investments of many 
investors, so $50 million may mean only a few pennies per individual 
investor in these funds. As a result, even if the legal system comes up 
with a way to distribute the money more effectively, this reallocation 
will result in only marginally increased returns for the investors on the 
receiving end of these funds.87 In other words, the amounts at stake will 
 
include a nonreversion provision. See, e.g., Amended Stipulation & Agreement of Settlement at 
Ex. A-1, Zacharia v. Straight Path Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-08051-JMV-MF (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 
2017) (noting that “[n]either Defendants nor any other person or entity that paid any portion of 
the Settlement Account . . . are entitled to get back any portion of the Settlement Fund once the 
Court’s order or judgment approving the Settlement becomes Final”); Stipulation of Settlement at 
18–19, In re DS Healthcare Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. No. 16-60661-WPD (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2017) 
(explaining the disbursement process for any remaining money in the Net Settlement Fund, which 
does not include any reversion to defendant). 
 86. Professor Adam Pritchard made this argument in an article Who Cares?, which was a 
response to Professors Cox and Thomas’s study of institutional investors’ failure to file claims in 
these cases. Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 884 (2002). In his article, 
Professor Pritchard used rough estimates to calculate that the amount of money institutions were 
losing by failing to file claims was less than 0.1 percent of their total funds under management, 
which he stated was “in the range of a rounding error.” Id. Based on this figure, he hypothesized 
that “[p]erhaps money managers have more important things to worry about. For example, money 
managers may spend their time investigating companies so as to avoid investing in fraudulent 
firms.” Id. 
 87. Id. 
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not fund otherwise-empty retirement accounts or make the next 
economic downturn financially irrelevant. Viewed within the broader 
context of the U.S. financial markets, these are relatively small 
amounts of money.88  
On the other hand, defendants pay out billions of dollars in 
securities class action settlements each year,89 and it is odd not to care 
about how billions of dollars are allocated in our legal system. Indeed, 
the legal system purports to care when it requires courts to approve 
settlement plans of allocation. If the compensatory goals of securities 
class actions were truly irrelevant, the legal system would not have any 
claims process at all. It would simply take the money from the 
defendants and give it to the U.S. Treasury or a worthy nonprofit. Or it 
would set fire to the money. The legal system does not do any of these 
things because it believes that individual investors have been injured 
by the defendants’ fraud and deserve to be made whole. The money in 
these settlements belongs to the class members, and it should be 
returned to them.  
The current compensation system also has distributional 
consequences for investors. Settlement funds are not distributed 
randomly under the current system. Some investors likely receive a far 
greater share of settlement funds than others because they have 
developed processes within their organizations that make it easy for 
them to regularly file claims or because they have effectively outsourced 
these processes. Given the complexity of the claims administration 
process, it is fair to assume that a greater percentage of large 
institutional investors have figured out how to navigate this process 
than have less sophisticated retail investors. As a result, although the 
opt-out model of securities class actions was designed to make these 
suits benefit all investors equally, the claims administration process 
means that large institutional investors are the ones who primarily 
benefit.  
The current distribution system also means that most investors 
do not personally experience the benefits of these suits, impacting the 
system in two significant ways. First, it contributes to the overall sense 
 
 88. It is important not to overstate this point. Yes, settlement amounts are a drop in the 
bucket compared to the total amount of investment in the United States, but they are not nothing. 
Between 2009 and 2018, the total amount of money paid by defendants in court-approved 
settlements was over $50 billion. See Boettrich & Starykh, supra note 71, at 34. To put this number 
in context, it is roughly equal to the annual budget of the Commonwealth of Virginia. See H.B. 30, 
2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (establishing Virginia’s operating expenses as more than 
$50 billion).  
 89. See Boettrich & Starykh, supra note 71, at 34 (showing that, from 2009 to 2018, 
defendants paid out an average of about $5 billion per year and no less than $1.8 billion in any of 
these years).  
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in society that securities class actions, and perhaps class actions more 
generally, are frivolous and do not benefit average investors. Second, it 
reduces investors’ interest in the suits, which in turn reduces their 
commitment to improving these suits. This area of the law is crucial to 
the functioning of the capital markets, and meaningful reform will not 
occur if investors have already written off these suits.90 In short, if the 
legal system can improve the claims administration process, it would 
not only put settlement funds in the pockets of a larger group of 
investors, but it could also impact the public’s confidence in these suits 
more broadly.  
II. TWO PATHS TO AUTOMATION 
The time has come to overhaul the legal system’s current 
approach to distributing settlement funds in securities class actions. 
This Part outlines two possible ways for claims administrators to access 
the necessary data and use it to automate the distribution of settlement 
funds in these suits. The first approach relies on market innovation. 
Building on a method used in the proxy context, claims administrators 
could work with banks and brokers to obtain transaction data of 
investors who bought or sold the issuer’s stock during the class period 
and then automatically distribute the investors’ pro rata shares of the 
settlement funds to them. The second approach relies on regulatory 
innovation, using the new Consolidated Audit Trail developed by the 
SEC to track relevant securities purchases and calculate settlement 
proceeds. As we will see, both approaches rely on technical 
improvements to the claims administration system combined with 
careful consideration of the incentives that motivate the various 
participants in these settlements.  
A. Automating Through Market Innovation 
1. An Automated Claims Administrator 
As outlined in the prior Part, the current claims administration 
process is hampered by the fact that only individual banks and brokers 
have access to the records that identify specific transactions by specific 
customers in a given company’s securities.91 Each bank and broker has 
data that identifies its own customers’ transactions, but no centralized 
 
 90. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 454 (“If the system needs reform, as both we and 
Professor Pritchard agree it does, the more institutional investors are active participants, the more 
pressure will be placed on the system to improve.”). 
 91. See supra Section I.C. 
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database collects all of this data. Yet this data gap is not 
insurmountable. Claims administrators could collect transactions data 
directly from banks and brokers and then use this data to distribute 
settlement funds to shareholders, obviating the need for a claims 
process. 
More specifically, this approach envisions that, once the parties 
reach a settlement, the claims administrator will reach out to the 
relevant banks and brokers across the country—approximately nine 
hundred in all—and ask for transaction data for any of their clients who 
bought or sold the company’s stock during the class period.92 This 
transaction data would include (1) the date of the relevant transactions, 
(2) the price at which the stock was bought or sold, (3) the number of 
shares for each transaction, and (4) identifying information regarding 
the beneficial owner—all of which is data that banks and brokers 
already have in their files. The claims administrator would request that 
banks and brokers produce this data in a standardized way, allowing 
the claims administrator to aggregate it into a single database.  
This proposal looks a lot like the current claims administration 
system, with one significant change. Under the current system, claims 
administrators ask banks and brokers for their clients’ contact 
information and then, using this contact information, they send claim 
forms to these clients in the hopes that they will fill out the forms and 
return them to the claims administrator. In contrast, under this 
proposal, the claims administrator would get all the necessary data 
directly from the banks and brokers. Banks and brokers place the 
relevant trades on behalf of their clients, so they have the information 
and documentation that claims administrators need. There is no need 
for the added step of asking class members to provide this information 
themselves.  
This is especially true when viewing the current system of 
claims administration through a process improvement lens. This lens 
requires an examination of each step in the current system to determine 
where problems and inefficiencies are most likely to occur.93 Using this 
 
 92. This estimate of the number of banks and brokers came from an interview with an 
employee at Broadridge Financial Solutions. A partial list also appears on DTCC’s website, 
although this list does not include banks and brokers that clear trades through other larger 
institutions. See DTC Participant Report, DTCC (Aug. 2019), 
http://www.dtcc.com/~/media/Files/Downloads/client-center/DTC/alpha.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
6WX5-WJ7N] (providing an alphabetical list of DTC participants). 
 93. See Silvia L. Coulter, Process Improvement and the Legal Work Product, PRAC. 
INNOVATIONS 3 (Mar. 2013), https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/signup/newsletters/ 
practice-innovations/2013-mar/Mar13_PracticeInnovations.pdf [https://perma.cc/U98T-88F8] 
(arguing that a process improvement methodology, which examines each individual area of a 
particular legal process, allows law firms to better manage a given project and provide higher 
quality legal work).  
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lens, most steps in the current system work relatively well. Claims 
administrators contact nearly all banks and brokers, banks and brokers 
pass along contact information for most putative class members, and 
most class members receive their claim forms. The process breaks down 
at one specific step—the step at which class members are supposed to 
fill out and return the claim forms. From a process improvement 
perspective, therefore, eliminating this step by getting the necessary 
data directly from banks and brokers would solve the principal problem 
with the current system.  
Once claims administrators receive the relevant data from 
banks and brokers, they can use it to calculate each class member’s pro 
rata share of the settlement. As part of this process, the claims 
administrator will have to compare the lists provided by the different 
banks and brokers to calculate the net number of shares purchased 
during the class period by each shareholder. This comparison will help 
ensure that a shareholder who purchased shares from one broker but 
sold shares through another broker is deemed to have the correct net 
purchases. This step will allow the claims administrator to calculate 
each class member’s estimated damages and his or her pro rata share 
of the settlement.  
At this point, the claims administrator could just send these 
funds to each class member using the contact information provided by 
the banks and brokers. Doing so, however, would not allow class 
members an adequate opportunity to contest the amount of their claim 
or to opt out of the class action.94 As a result, the claims administrator 
should instead send class members a letter that would (1) inform them 
of the presumptive value of their claim in the settlement, as well as how 
this value was calculated,95 and (2) let them know that they will 
automatically receive this amount, either by check or electronic deposit, 
unless they opt out of the class action by a certain date. The class 
members should then have at least sixty days to review their options.96 
If they do nothing, they will automatically receive their calculated share 
of the settlement fund. 
 
 94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (providing that class members must be notified of their 
opportunity to opt out of the class action).  
 95. Claims administrators will have to calculate these amounts before knowing how many 
class members will ultimately opt out of the litigation or challenge the calculation of their share 
of the settlement. As a result, claims administrators may want to inform class members that their 
recovery will likely fall within a certain range, rather than specifying an exact amount. If far more 
class members than expected opt out or challenge the calculations, the claims administrator may 
have to provide a new round of notice and opportunity to opt out.  
 96. The claims administrator should then have at least sixty days to review any objections to 
the calculations and respond accordingly.  
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This proposal is not wholly different from the current process of 
distributing settlement funds. Claims administrators would still use 
customer data to determine each class member’s share of the settlement 
fund. The difference is that the claims administrator would have access 
to the transaction data for all investors who bought or sold the 
company’s stock during the class period, not just for the relatively small 
number of investors who file claim forms. As a result, nearly all class 
members would receive their share of the settlement fund.  
One likely hurdle is that banks and brokers will be reluctant to 
release transaction data and other sensitive customer information to 
claims administrators. Overcoming this reluctance will require action 
by the courts that oversee these settlements. First, courts should 
require banks and brokers to participate in this stage of the process. 
This step may sound radical, but courts already require banks and 
brokers to participate in the claims administration process, just in a 
slightly different way. In most judicial orders granting preliminary 
approval to settlements in securities class actions, the court orders 
banks and brokers to send the claim forms to their clients who 
transacted in the company’s stock during the class period.97 
Alternatively, the banks and brokers give the claims administrator the 
contact information for these clients so the administrator can send them 
the claim forms directly.98 Under either approach, however, the banks 
and brokers must participate in the claims administration process.  
If courts want to automate the settlement distribution process, 
they will have to amend this portion of their standard preliminary 
approval orders. In addition to clients’ contact information, courts will 
also have to require banks and brokers to turn over their clients’ 
detailed transaction data in the relevant securities, which is far more 
sensitive information than they currently provide. As discussed in 
detail in Part III,99 courts should not go down this road unless they are 
confident that claims administrators can secure this data. If the claims 
administrators can make this showing, however, the court should order 
the banks and brokers to provide the necessary information.  
 
 97. See, e.g., Preliminary Approval Order para. 14, Robb v. Fitbit Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00151-SI 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2018); Order Granting Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class 
Action Settlement para. 16, In re Tangoe, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 3:17-cv-00146-VLB (D. Conn. Nov. 
13, 2017).  
 98. See, e.g., Preliminary Approval Order, supra note 97, para. 14; Order Granting Lead 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, supra note 97, para. 16.  
 99. See infra Section III.A. 
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2. Spurring Market Innovation 
This proposal would overhaul a system that has remained 
largely the same for decades. Such a significant overhaul would not be 
easy, and courts, attorneys, and lead plaintiffs do not always have the 
right incentives to pursue these changes, as described in the next 
Section. Nonetheless, as we have seen in a number of other industries, 
innovation is possible even if traditional market participants prefer the 
status quo. This Section describes three different ways that this 
proposal could get off the ground, providing a foundation for the 
discussion in the next Section about the incentives of the existing 
participants in the settlement process to support these changes. 
Before turning to how the private market could spur automation 
in this area, it is worth noting that companies can make a fair amount 
of money in the claims administration industry. Although there is not 
market data on the average amount that claims administrators 
currently charge, it appears that they often receive between $100,000 
and $300,000 in fees for overseeing the distribution process.100 Given 
that there are typically between sixty and eighty securities class actions 
per year,101 a rough estimate of the total market size is around $15 
million. If claims administrators expand automation to other forms of 
corporate and securities litigation, such as SEC enforcement suits, the 
total revenue could be far higher. In other words, there is money to be 
made in this business, and a company that offers an innovative claims 
administration process could capture a significant part of this 
market.102 The question, therefore, is what types of companies are 
particularly well situated to make this move.  
 
 100. See, e.g., Order Authorizing Payments for Settlement Administration Expenses from 
Settlement Funds at 2, Robb v. Fitbit Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00151-SI (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2018) 
(authorizing a payment of approximately $330,000 in connection with the claims administration 
process); Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Distribution Plan & Incorporated Memorandum 
of Law at 6, In re Altisource Portfolio Sols., S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 9:14-CV-81156-WPD (S.D. Fla. 
Aug. 2, 2018) (requesting a payment of approximately $200,000 for the claims administrator); 
Letter from James E. Cecchi to Judge Sheridan at 1, In re CommVault Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 
14-cv-05628 (PGS)(LHG) (D.N.J. May 18, 2018), ECF 132 (authorizing a payment of up to $225,000 
to the claims administrator). In larger cases, the claims administration fees are significantly more. 
See, e.g., Order & Final Judgment para. 18, In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., No. 14-cv-9662 (JSR) 
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018) (authorizing up to $3.8 million in claims administration fees for the 
distribution of an approximately $3 billion settlement).  
 101. See Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action 
Settlements: 2017 Review and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RES., 3 (2017), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2017-
Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/R8V2-UZ6G] (graphing the amount of settlement dollars 
awarded in class action suits and providing the number of class actions in each year from 2008 
until 2017). 
 102. If the fees are not enough to compensate a claims administrator for its fees in setting up 
this new system, a court would be justified in authorizing higher fees to spur this market change. 
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First, one of the traditional claims administration companies 
could automate its processes with the goal of stealing market share 
from its competitors. Right now, these companies all use the same basic 
system to distribute settlement funds,103 which makes it difficult for any 
one company to distinguish itself in this market. These companies can 
try to compete on price, among other factors, but the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys charged with choosing among claims administration 
companies do not pay this fee themselves. Instead, they receive a gross 
percentage of the settlement regardless of the amount of the claim 
administration fees. As a result, plaintiffs’ attorneys are also motivated 
by the promise that the claims administration firm will distribute the 
settlement funds competently and without error. In a world of fairly 
standard prices and processes, claims administration firms do not have 
much room to distinguish themselves. A company that brings an 
innovative approach to its relationships with banks and brokers could 
disrupt this status quo and increase its own profits.  
Second, a new entrant could offer these services. Broadridge 
Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) is in a unique position to make 
this move. Broadridge has already developed a niche as a proxy 
intermediary,104 working with banks and brokers to pass along proxy 
materials directly to their customers.105 Prior to a corporation’s annual 
meeting, banks and brokers send Broadridge a list of customers who 
own the corporation’s stock.106 Broadridge then works with the 
 
These increased fees would come at the expense of class members in that particular lawsuit, but 
given the diversification of most investors, these class members would be compensated for these 
fees in future suits in which they have a far greater likelihood of receiving their pro rata shares of 
settlement funds.  
 103. See, e.g., The Role of the Claims Administrator in Securities Class Action Settlements, 
supra note 44 (describing the process used by claims administrators).  
 104. At least annually, corporations must send proxy materials to their shareholders, 
providing them with detailed information on the matters up for a vote at the annual shareholder 
meeting and soliciting their proxy for these votes. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2019). As discussed above, 
corporations do not have complete lists of their shareholders, so they used to have to reach out to 
every bank and brokerage house to find out the number of their customers who owned the 
corporation’s securities. The corporation would then pass along that number of proxy statements 
to the banks and brokers, and the banks and brokers would in turn pass them along to their 
customers. Broadridge’s services have obviated the need for corporations to engage in this time-
consuming process on their own.  
 105. See, e.g., Proxy Management, BROADRIDGE FIN. SERVS., 
https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/capital-markets/streamline-trade-support-
services/proxy-management? (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TS9B-NWTT]. 
Broadridge “dominates” proxy distribution, with “98% of the market.” Donald, supra note 73, at 
71. 
 106. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1227, 1244–45 (2008) (explaining the “critical role” held by Broadridge because of its access to 
information regarding the identities of the corporate shareholders). 
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corporation to pass along the proxy materials.107 The process feels 
seamless for corporations, as well as for banks and brokers, because 
Broadridge has created an automated system to handle most of the 
logistics. 
Broadridge could expand its services to include claims 
administration in securities litigation.108 This expansion would require 
Broadridge to increase the data that it collects. Under its current 
practices, Broadridge does not have a record of customers’ individual 
transactions. The data that it receives from banks and brokers only 
provides the names and addresses of investors who owned stock in a 
given corporation as of the record date.109 Broadridge, however, could 
leverage the relationships it has built in the proxy context to obtain this 
additional data. Or another company with entrepreneurial aspirations 
in this area could develop these relationships much the same way that 
Broadridge did when it first developed its niche in the proxy market.  
Finally, courts could take the lead in overhauling this system by 
appointing a special master paid out of the settlement fund to oversee 
the distribution of these funds. This approach would mirror one used by 
the SEC in a few of its own enforcement actions. For example, in 2006, 
the SEC reached a settlement with two companies called Columbia 
Management Advisors, Inc. and Columbia Funds Distributor, Inc. 
(collectively, “Columbia”), which the SEC claimed had engaged in 
undisclosed market-timing arrangements.110 As part of the settlement, 
Columbia agreed to pay $140 million into a fund that would compensate 
injured investors.111 When it came to distributing the $140 million to 
Columbia’s investors, the SEC could have used a process similar to the 
 
 107. See id. at 1245–46 (“Once the issuer has identified its beneficial owners, it must provide 
each custodian with sufficient copies of the proxy packet (proxy cards, annual report, and proxy 
statement). . . . Typically, Broadridge performs all of these tasks as an agent for the custodians.”). 
 108. Broadridge currently has a small division devoted to securities class action settlements. 
See Global Securities Class Action Services, BROADRIDGE FIN. SERVS., 
https://www.broadridge.com/financial-services/wealth-management/wealth/advance-control-risk-
and-support-services/global-securities-class-action-services (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) 
[perma.cc/9K86-2GPS]. It has mostly focused on helping investors claim their shares of 
settlements. It has not tried to automate the system as a whole.  
 109. See, e.g., Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, 
Witness Statement of Charles Pasfield, ¶ 10 (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0612.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4G6-
V9WL] (stating that “[w]hen a corporate issuer needs to communicate with its beneficial owners,” 
Broadridge collects “the name, address, and number of securities held for each beneficial owner” 
from the banks and brokers). 
 110. See Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Making 
Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-Desist Order, Columbia Mgmt. 
Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8534, Exchange Act Release No. 51164, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2531, Investment Company Act Release No. 26752 (Feb. 9, 2005).  
 111. See id. § IV.E. 
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one typically used in securities class actions. In other words, the agency 
could have hired a claims administrator, distributed notice of the 
settlement, and required Columbia’s investors to fill out lengthy claim 
forms documenting their losses. Indeed, this is the normal process for 
distributing Fair Funds proceeds in SEC enforcement actions.112  
Instead, however, the SEC hired an outside expert—Professor 
Lawrence Hamermesh—as an Independent Distribution Consultant 
(“IDC”) to develop a distribution plan.113 Professor Hamermesh and his 
team directly reached out to banks and brokers and asked them which 
of their clients had invested in the Columbia funds.114 They also 
requested specific information about these investments.115 After 
receiving this information, the SEC then distributed the appropriate 
portion of the settlement proceeds to individual investors, billing the 
cost of this process to the defendants.116 According to the SEC, this 
outreach “obviat[ed] any need for a claims process.”117  
This approach was undoubtedly more time-consuming for the 
SEC, as the IDC and the experts hired by the IDC had to contact 
individual banks and brokers to obtain the necessary information. Yet 
this investment of time and resources meant that all Columbia 
investors injured by the alleged fraud received their pro rata share of 
the settlement fund. In addition, if there is related litigation filed 
against the same company, an IDC could use the same process to 
distribute settlement funds in these other lawsuits, creating economies 
of scale. If the company paid settlements in both a securities class action 
and an SEC enforcement action, for example, the IDC could reduce the 
cost of the claims administration process by using the same data to 
distribute both settlement funds.  
In short, a variety of market players—including traditional 
claims administrators, Broadridge, and special masters hired by the 
court—could potentially take the lead in automating the claims 
 
 112. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the 
SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 343 (2015) (describing the process that the 
SEC uses to distribute Fair Funds).  
 113. Proposed Plan of Distribution ¶¶ 1.1, 7.2, Columbia Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Admin. Proc. 
File No. 3-11814 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54175-pdp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6XD-LL5F]. 
 114. See id. ¶ 7.6 (discussing distribution to omnibus and retirement accounts in the case).  
 115. See id.  
 116. See Proposed Plan of Distribution, supra note 113, ¶¶ 7.6–7.7 (explaining that omnibus 
account holders could provide customer information to the IDC or distribute the funds themselves, 
while retirement holders had to distribute the funds in accordance with their contractual and 
statutory obligations).  
 117. Order Approving a Distribution Plan at 2, Columbia Mgmt. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 55598 (Apr. 6, 2007). 
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administration process, and these players could make money by doing 
so. As we will see, however, they cannot do it alone.  
3. Legal Support of Market Innovation 
Even if claims administrators are eager to overhaul their 
practices, they cannot automate the claims administration process 
without help. Market innovation will not happen unless courts or other 
lawmakers provide legal support for these changes. At the very least, 
claims administrators need courts to order banks and brokers to provide 
them with the relevant transaction data and contact information for 
their clients. Ideally, however, they would also help drive reforms in 
this area, asking the hard questions that could prompt a review of long-
standing practices.  
The history of reform in the proxy area is illustrative. As 
discussed above, Broadridge overhauled the proxy system by working 
with banks and brokers to pass along proxy materials directly to their 
customers.118 Yet Broadridge did not rely on charm alone to convince 
banks and brokers to turn over customer data. Instead, Broadridge was 
able to get this data from banks and brokers because SEC rules 
required them to share it with Broadridge.119 The SEC also required 
issuers to pay for these banks’ and brokers’ proxy-related expenses, 
which further encouraged these institutions to work with Broadridge.120 
When it comes to the claims administration process, it would not be 
technologically difficult for a private company to work with banks and 
brokers to obtain the customer data needed to distribute settlement 
funds. The challenge comes in giving banks and brokers a legal 
incentive to cooperate with whatever private company leads these 
efforts. 
Lead plaintiffs and their counsel are unlikely to drive any 
changes in this area because they have a conflict of interest when it 
comes to the distribution of settlement funds. Right now, settlement 
funds are divided among the relatively low percentage of shareholders 
who file a claim, a group that presumably includes the lead plaintiff.121 
If the system is automated, however, these same funds will be divided 
among all class members who can be identified through bank and 
broker records. This change would benefit class members who would 
not file a claim under the current system because they currently get no 
financial benefit from the settlement. In contrast, shareholders who 
 
 118. See discussion supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text. 
 119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2019). 
 120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2 (2019). 
 121. See supra Section I.B.  
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already participate in settlements are financially better off filing claims 
under the current, more burdensome system and hoping that their 
fellow class members are not willing to jump through the same 
administrative hoops.122  
Their attorneys are also unlikely to push for reform. In theory, 
lead counsel is supposed to protect the entire class, not just the lead 
plaintiff and other participating class members.123 As scholars have 
long recognized, however, they do not have the right financial 
incentives to fulfill these fiduciary obligations when it comes to 
distribution of the settlement fund.124 Lead counsel receives no financial 
benefit from improving how settlement funds are distributed. Their 
contingency fee depends on the total value of the settlement, not on how 
the settlement is allocated.125 As a result, they are at best indifferent to 
this stage of the process. In many cases, however, lead counsel may 
have a financial incentive to oppose automation. Under the PSLRA, 
institutional investors are law firms’ ticket into securities class 
actions.126 As discussed above, institutional investors who regularly 
participate in these suits will not want their attorneys to press for 
automation because it will reduce their personal recoveries. A law firm 
that alienated its institutional clients would find it much more difficult 
 
 122. To understand this point, return to the example of a securities class action that settles 
for $50 million. Imagine that the total damages of the class are $1 billion and that the lead plaintiff 
has damages of $10 million. Under the current system, perhaps twenty percent of claims totaling 
$200 million would be filed because most class members will not jump through the logistical hoops 
of tracking down their transaction data and filing a claim. This claims rate means that each class 
member who files a claim will receive twenty-five percent of damages claimed. The lead plaintiff 
will therefore receive $2.5 million.  
 Under an automated claims administration system, however, the lead plaintiff’s share of the 
settlement fund would likely fall dramatically. The lead plaintiff would no longer be sharing the 
settlement with the twenty percent of class members who filed claims. Instead, they would be 
sharing the settlement fund with the close to one hundred percent of class members who can be 
identified through bank and broker records. This increased participation means that each class 
member would receive approximately five percent of damages claimed. Under the example above, 
the institutional lead plaintiff will now receive $500,000, or twenty percent of its recovery under 
the current system. 
 123. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B). Courts have recognized that, in carrying out this obligation, 
the interests of the class may diverge from the interests of the named plaintiff and that in such 
instances the duties run to the class as a whole, not to the named plaintiff or any other specific 
class members. See, e.g., Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956, 964 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 124. See Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 301, 317 (2003) (noting that “lawyers always incur conflicts when recommending 
settlement allocations”).  
 125. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, The Theory of Fee Regulation in Class Action Settlements, 46 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1429, 1440, 1470 (1997) (explaining that, under a system that caps fees, such as a 
contingency fee model, “the counsel is largely indifferent to the distribution of the settlement 
recovery”). 
 126. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2012) (providing that the lead plaintiff “shall, subject to the 
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class”).  
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to win lead counsel fights. As a result, law firms that want to hold onto 
their clients are unlikely to press for changes in how settlement funds 
are distributed.127  
Instead, if change is to come to the claims administration 
process, it will need to be driven by courts or other lawmakers. They 
will have to be the ones to inquire into automation or create incentives 
for attorneys to automate. And yet these groups face their own 
disincentives to overhaul the process. Under the current system, judges 
have little involvement in how settlement funds are distributed.128 Lead 
counsel typically presents the judge with the settlement agreement and 
a proposed plan of allocation; the judge generally approves it without 
much inquiry. It is quite rare for judges to question the attorneys about 
the details of these documents or to require changes to them.129 This 
hands-off approach results in part because claims distribution comes at 
the very end of the case, when everyone involved is ready for the case 
to be over. As one scholar stated, “[L]itigation warfare is news; peace is 
an afterthought.”130 If judges are unwilling to ask basic questions about 
settlement terms, they are likely to be even less willing to take the lead 
in overhauling how settlement funds are distributed. 
Moreover, even if judges wanted to change the procedures 
involved in claims administration, they face structural impediments in 
doing so. Automating the claims administration process requires 
sophisticated financial and technical knowledge. Judges will have to 
understand the complicated ways in which securities are transferred 
and held in the financial markets, as well as the technologies involved 
in obtaining customer data from banks and brokers, calculating 
settlement claims, and distributing funds directly to class members. A 
 
 127. This analysis is not meant to impugn the integrity of these law firms. Some law firms 
may well support automation despite these potential costs, recognizing that their duty is to the 
class, not to the lead plaintiffs. Yet it would be hard for any firm to ignore the very real risk that 
automation could drive away their client base. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 19, at 65 (“It is not 
uncommon, therefore, to see counsel satisfied with a low claiming rate because the proportionate 
payments to each claimant will be higher.”). 
 128. There are, however, a few well-known examples of judges who have chosen to be far more 
involved in the settlement process. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class 
Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 113 (2003) (discussing Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York as the “most prominent example of the 
expansive role a judge might play in settling class action litigation, its pitfalls and possibilities”). 
 129. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377 (2011) (arguing that 
judges are not “doing their jobs” when it comes to scrutinizing settlements in securities class 
actions). 
 130. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Democratization of Mass Litigation: Empowering the Beneficiaries, 
45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 481, 481 (2012). 
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judge presented with a plan for automation that outlines these details 
may well not feel competent to evaluate them.131  
Automation is also risky, especially in the beginning when 
courts and claims distribution companies are figuring out the kinks. 
Judges will have to contend with data security issues, which they may 
not understand very well. They will also have to think through the 
possibility of fraud, which is a real risk given that millions of dollars 
are on the line.132 And they will have to ensure that the funds are sent 
to the right bank accounts and physical addresses. In short, a process 
that judges can largely ignore right now will suddenly take up a lot of 
time and create a risk of significant problems.133 
Where do these challenges leave the automation process? At a 
minimum, it means that judges are unlikely to lead this effort. Instead, 
they are more likely to be in a position of reacting to the proposals of 
other players in the settlement process—namely, private companies 
hoping to make money by introducing a new claims distribution model. 
If these companies can convince judges that the risks are relatively 
small, judges may acquiesce, but the private market will have to do 
most of the heavy lifting.  
Recent amendments to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure may make it easier for private companies to convince judges 
that they need to pay more attention to the claims administration 
process. Rule 23 used to be silent on the distribution of settlement funds 
in class actions.134 The new version, however, provides that a court must 
consider “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief 
to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims, if 
required.”135 New best practices also emphasize that, in requesting 
approval for class action settlements, “[t]he parties should describe the 
proposed plan for equitably and reasonably distributing the settlement 
 
 131. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory 
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1470 (2006) (stating that “judges are for the most part 
generalists, handling all forms of cases and encountering class action settlements only 
occasionally,” which makes it difficult for them to develop a nuanced understanding of how the law 
works in particular settings). 
 132. See infra Section III.B. 
 133. Cf. Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action 
Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 907–08 (2016) (“U.S. judges, steeped in the adversary 
system, are ill-equipped for the inquisitorial judging required for careful review of class 
settlements.”). 
 134. Not only did the text of Rule 23 itself not mention claims administration, but the judicial 
standards for reviewing settlements also did not mention this issue. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 
128, at 86 (discussing the standards that courts used to review settlements under Rule 23(e)). 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(ii).  
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funds to class members.”136 For the first time, therefore, the rules and 
accompanying guidance to judges stress that they should pay close 
attention to how class action settlements are distributed. These 
amendments provide a window of opportunity for private companies 
seeking to disrupt this market.  
Finally, private companies should make it as easy as possible for 
judges to support automation. For example, rather than asking judges 
to oversee every detail of a new claims administration process, judges 
could outsource this oversight to a special master. Alternatively, they 
could create incentives for class counsel to explore automation on their 
own. Current rules do not require class counsel to report back to the 
judge on the claims distribution process, including the percentage of 
class members who filed claims.137 Additionally, contingency fees 
typically do not depend on how many class members file claims. Judges 
could change these incentives by requiring class counsel to file a 
detailed report outlining the percentage of class members who filed 
claims, as well as specific efforts to maximize this figure. They could 
even go one step further and hold back a portion of the fee until class 
counsel is able to get a certain percentage (such as fifty percent or more) 
of class members to file claims.138  
Alternatively, the SEC could take the lead. The next Section 
addresses how the SEC could use its own data to automate the claims 
distribution process, but the SEC could also adopt rules requiring banks 
and brokers to provide claims administrators with the relevant data, 
similar to what the SEC has done in the proxy context. Unlike judges 
applying ad hoc oversight, the SEC could use the rulemaking process to 
study the claims administration process more systematically and 
develop rules that guard against data breach and fraud. It could also 
begin monitoring the impact of these rules to ensure that they are 
functioning effectively.  
The SEC could also play a role in solving a slightly different 
problem. The process outlined in the prior Section in which banks and 
 
 136. Guidelines and Best Practices: Implementing 2018 Amendments to Rule 23 Class Action 
Settlement Provisions, BOLCH JUD. INST., DUKE LAW SCH. 10 (2018), 
https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Class-Actions-Best-Practices-Final-
Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9TC-CTK4].  
 137. See, e.g., Lahav, supra note 128, at 87–88 (“[N]either the Rules nor most courts require 
the parties to report on the ultimate payout at the end of settlement administration.”). 
 138. Scholars have made this suggestion in the mass tort context, where many of these same 
issues arise. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 67, 148 (2017) (recommending that judges “should require parties to submit an accounting 
statement” that describes, among other things, “how the settlement funds were allocated” and “the 
number of plaintiffs who submitted claims” and then should award attorneys’ fees based on “a 
percentage of plaintiffs’ actual recovery, not the fund itself”). 
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brokers provide claims administrators with relevant transaction data 
would work well for investors who trade directly through a bank or 
broker. Complications arise, however, when it comes to mutual funds 
or other types of funds in which investors’ money is pooled and these 
pooled funds are used to purchase securities. For pooled funds, even if 
claims administrators receive customer data directly from banks and 
brokers, this data will only show the funds’ investments, not the pro 
rata interests of those invested in the funds. 
If fund investors remained the same over time, this structure 
would not pose a problem in the settlement process. Claims 
administrators would simply send the settlement money to the funds 
and the individual investors would indirectly receive their shares of the 
settlement as a result of their continuing investment in the fund. The 
challenge, however, is that settlements typically come years after the 
underlying fraud, and in the intervening years, the individual investors 
in specific funds often change. As a result, simply depositing settlement 
money into the funds will provide a windfall to investors who joined the 
fund after the fraud and leave uncompensated those who left the fund 
before the settlement.  
In discussing these challenges, Professors Cox and Thomas 
stated that “[i]deally, we would want to have any recovery that the fund 
makes credited to the accounts of those persons that held interests in 
the fund at the time of the loss suffered in proportion to their share of 
those losses.”139 What their survey of large, institutional investors 
actually found was that the funds either deposited settlement money 
into the specific portfolio fund that suffered the loss or into the fund’s 
general account. No funds distributed the money to the accounts of 
specific investors.140 As Professors Cox and Thomas noted, funds likely 
take this approach to avoid “complex calculations about who the 
particular beneficiaries were at that point in time and what percentage 
of the recovery they were entitled to receive.”141 
The data, however, exists to automate this part of the system as 
well. Investment funds know which of their clients had money in the 
impacted funds; this data should be in the funds’ electronic files. In a 
world of increasing data sophistication, it should not be overly difficult 
for investment funds to provide claims administrators with the names 
and contact information of those investors who were invested in the 
funds during the class period. The challenge is that these funds have no 
obligation to provide claims administrators with this data. Nor do they 
 
 139. Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 437. 
 140. Id. at 438. 
 141. Id. at 437–38. 
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have any clear obligation to pass along settlement money to those 
investors who lost money.142 
The SEC could help with this part of the puzzle as well. The next 
Section discusses how the SEC can take more sweeping action to 
overhaul the claims administration process by using its own data, but 
the SEC could also spur the changes discussed in this Section. 
Specifically, it could adopt a rule requiring investment funds to pass 
along settlement money to the beneficial investors who were injured by 
the fraud, at least if their pro rata amount is more than a nominal 
amount. Alternatively, it could require these funds to provide claims 
administrators with transaction data for their beneficial investors, 
allowing the administrators to distribute the settlement money directly 
to these investors. Either approach would allow claims administrators 
to fully accomplish their goal of distributing settlement funds to all 
investors injured by the underlying fraud.   
The SEC may not be eager to take up these issues, however. The 
agency has its own agenda when it comes to investor protection, and it 
may not want to put institutional energy and resources toward 
reforming the claims administration process. Indeed, the SEC tends to 
be fairly hands-off when it comes to private enforcement of the federal 
securities laws, with limited exceptions.143 On the other hand, securities 
class actions often target the same underlying misconduct as SEC civil 
enforcement actions, and the SEC has stated that securities class 
actions provide “valuable and necessary additional deterrence against 
securities fraud . . . supplementing the [SEC’s] own enforcement 
activities.”144 Given the SEC’s stated mission to “protect investors,”145 it 
 
 142. These funds may have a fiduciary duty to distribute settlement funds to beneficial 
investors injured by the fraud. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on 
the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 855, 860–67 (2002) (discussing the fiduciary duties of mutual funds and other investment 
companies). Nonetheless, this duty alone has not changed the funds’ underlying practices. See Cox 
& Thomas, supra note 8, at 438–39 (finding a “widespread failure to file claims in securities fraud 
class actions” among institutional investors). 
 143. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012) (invalidating “[a]ny . . . provision binding any person . . . to 
waive compliance with any provision” of the securities laws); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012) 
(invalidating “[a]ny . . . provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision” of 
the securities laws or “any rule of a self-regulatory organization”). 
 144. Concerning the Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 3 
(1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission); see also Dain C. Donelson et al., The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in 
Securities Fraud Class Action Settlements, 58 J.L. & ECON. 747, 775 (2015) (stating that “the 
United States relies on private enforcement as a complement to public enforcement, particularly 
for securities regulation”). 
 145. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/basics/role-sec (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FX3F-YBR4]. 
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is not a stretch to think that the SEC should offer some regulatory 
assistance in this area. As we shall see, however, the SEC can do even 
more by opening its own databases to claims administrators.  
B. Automating Through Regulation 
The second option for automating the distribution of settlement 
funds in securities class action relies on the SEC’s plan for a new 
database to track activity in the securities markets. As discussed in 
Part I, the current hurdles in the claims administration process result 
from the fact that there is no central database that tracks all purchases 
and sales in a given company’s securities.146 Yet the SEC is in the 
process of creating exactly this type of database. The SEC’s plan for a 
Consolidated Audit Trail (“CAT”) will contain all of the information 
needed to automate the claims distribution process in securities class 
actions. This Section provides an overview of the CAT, explaining how 
it can be used to distribute settlement funds. It then discusses the 
institutional challenges involved in using data from the CAT in this 
way.  
1. The SEC’s New Data Opportunity 
Although not up and running yet, the CAT will soon allow 
regulators to track all securities activity in the U.S. financial markets. 
The desire for the CAT arose out of the so-called Flash Crash in 2010, 
in which $1 trillion of value disappeared from the securities markets in 
less than 30 minutes because of high frequency trades that went 
awry.147 Following the Flash Crash, the SEC decided that it needed 
greater surveillance and control over the financial markets.148 In 
August 2012, it promulgated Rule 613, which required self-regulatory 
organizations (“SROs”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) to jointly submit a plan to create, implement and 
 
 146. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 147. Press Release, Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Status 
of the Consolidated Audit Trail (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/statement-status-consolidated-audit-trail-chairman-jay-clayton 
[https://perma.cc/VP9A-47GP] (stating that the SEC adopted Rule 613 “in the wake of the 2010 
‘Flash Crash’ ”).  
 148. See id. (stating that the CAT was developed to provide regulators with better oversight 
of securities markets); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 435, 454 (2014) (analogizing the CAT to street crime policing and stating that “the 
consolidated audit trail will be a way for the SEC to gain access to more streets so that its own 
cops can directly observe the activity there and analyze the information to make better use of its 
resources”). 
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maintain the CAT.149 These players subsequently developed the CAT 
National Market System (“NMS”) Plan,150 a 267-page document that 
outlines in great specificity the plans for the CAT.  
Once operational, “the CAT will be the world’s largest data 
repository for securities transactions.”151 It will track approximately 
fifty-eight billion records every day—including orders, executions, and 
quote life cycles152—and this number is projected to increase rapidly 
over time.153 For each transaction, the CAT will record the buy/sell 
price, the number of shares involved, and the date and time (down to 
the millisecond) that the trade occurred.154 The CAT will also give all 
investors a unique customer identifier that will be used consistently 
across all banks and brokers reporting into the CAT.155 For individual 
clients, this identifier will be linked to the customer’s name, address, 
date of birth, and social security number.156 For institutional clients, 
the identifier will be linked to their name, address, and employer 
identification number or legal entity identifier.157 This linking will give 
regulators the ability to track the transactions of individual customers 
across different banks and brokers.158  
This is exactly the data that claims administrators are currently 
lacking. The entire claims administration process is designed to 
 
 149. 17 C.F.R. § 242.613 (2019). 
 150. See Limited Liability Company Agreement of CAT NMS, LLC, CONSOLIDATED AUDIT 
TRAIL, https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/34-79318-exhibit-a.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3AQC-P3LM] [hereinafter CAT NMS Plan]. 
 151. SROs Launch Study to Analyze Implementation Cost of the Consolidated Audit Trail, 
CONSOLIDATED AUDIT TRAIL 2 (June 23, 2014), https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/p534383.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2ZH-YAWA].  
 152. Id. at 2. 
 153. See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031, 
1086 (2016) (stating that the volume of data from the equities, options, futures, and indexes 
increased fourfold in a single year).  
 154. 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(c)(7) (listing the information that must be included in the CAT plan); 
CAT Reporting Technical Specifications for Industry Members, THESYS CAT 20–63 (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Industry-Member-Tech-Specs-Order-
Events-v1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9AA-NRMU] (outlining the technical data that must be 
submitted for various types of orders and trades).  
 155. See CAT NMS Plan, supra note 150, app. C at 7–9 (“[T]he CAT NMS Plan must require 
each CAT Reporter to record and report ‘Customer-ID(s) for each customer’ when reporting to the 
CAT order receipt or origination information.”). Under Rule 613(j)(3), the term “customer” includes 
“(i) The account holder(s) of the account at a registered broker-dealer originating the order; and 
(ii) Any person from whom the broker-dealer is authorized to accept trading instructions for such 
account, if different from the account holder(s).” 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(j)(3).  
 156. CAT NMS Plan, supra note 150, § 1.1. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(c)(8), (j)(5) (requiring all CAT plan sponsors and members to “use 
the same Customer-ID and CAT-Reporter-ID for each customer and broker-dealer” and defining 
Customer-ID as “a code that uniquely and consistently identifies such customer for purposes of 
providing data to the central repository”).  
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recreate this data by collecting claim forms from those who purchased 
or sold the relevant company’s securities during the class period. Soon, 
however, this information will be readily available from the CAT. The 
exact timing of the CAT rollout is unclear. Certain market participants 
were supposed to start reporting into the CAT in November 2018,159 but 
they missed this deadline. The SROs and FINRA proposed a new 
timeline that would delay the start of this reporting until the fall of 
2019,160 and the SEC tentatively accepted this new timeline.161 In late 
January 2019, however, the stock exchanges fired the company hired to 
build and oversee the CAT,162 and it is unclear whether this 
development will further delay the CAT timeline.  
Whenever banks and brokers start reporting into the CAT, this 
data will be more accurate than other forms of transactional data 
currently available to the SEC and other market regulators. Take the 
blue sheets, for example. Federal law requires broker-dealers to assist 
the SEC and other regulatory agencies upon request by providing these 
agencies with information concerning transactions by their clients who 
bought or sold a given security during a specified review period.163 This 
system, commonly known as the “electronic blue sheet” or “EBS” 
system, assists the SEC in conducting market timing and insider 
trading investigations.164 In practice, however, blue sheet data is often 
incomplete, inaccurate, or both.165 As a result, the SEC does not rely on 
 
 159. See Industry Update on the Consolidated Audit Trail, CAT NMS, LLC OPERATING COMM. 
9 (June 28, 2018), https://www.catnmsplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CAT-Industry-
Webcast-6.28.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F9P-QDR7] (“Currently . . . the CAT NMS Plan state[s] 
that each Participant must require its Industry Members . . . to report . . . by November 15, 
2018.”). 
 160. Id. at 4. 
 161. See Brett Redfearn, Statement on the Status of the Consolidated Audit Trail, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/tm-status-
consolidated-audit-trail [https://perma.cc/D47U-3BZP] (recognizing the impracticability for 
industry members to report data to the CAT while the CAT has not been sufficiently developed). 
 162. Dave Michaels, Stock Exchanges to Fire Company Building Stock-Market Supercomputer, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-exchanges-to-fire-company-
building-stock-market-supercomputer-11548956486 [https://perma.cc/YZK5-YFJ9]. 
 163. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-25 (2019) (requiring all exchange members, brokers, and dealers 
to, upon request, provide to the SEC information regarding the transaction date; price; number of 
shares; account number; and customer’s name, address, and tax identification number for trades 
that she effectuates).  
 164. Electronic Submission of Securities Transaction Information by Exchange Members, 
Brokers, and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 44,494, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,836 (June 29, 2001) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 240).  
 165. See, e.g., Michael Drews, Capco: Blue Sheet Blues - Regulators Renewed Interest in Total 
Transparency, RISKTECH F. (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.risktech-forum.com/opinion/capco-blue-
sheet-blues-regulators-renewed-interest-in-total-transparency [https://perma.cc/HE6P-TVB5] 
(quoting a securities market insider as stating, “Over and over we are seeing feeds from various 
source systems and mapping tables not being thoroughly documented, causing data attributes to 
be inadvertently dropped from regulatory reporting obligations, including Electronic Blue 
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it in distributing Fair Funds recoveries, although it has on occasion 
given blue sheet data to claims administrators to use as a starting point 
in their process.166 The CAT will be a much-needed upgrade of the blue 
sheet data, centralizing it in a single database with a uniform system 
of recordkeeping. 
Using this data to automate the distribution of settlement funds 
in securities class actions would not be difficult. The CAT is essentially 
a giant spreadsheet with the equivalent of separate rows for various 
securities and separate columns for various details about individual 
transactions in these securities. Following a settlement in a securities 
class action, the SEC could provide data from the relevant rows and 
columns to the claims administrator, so the claims administrator would 
know who purchased or sold the securities during the class period and 
at what price. The claims administrator could then run this data 
through the damage models in the plan of allocation to calculate each 
class member’s pro rata share of the settlement fund. Once the claims 
administrator has made these calculations, it can send each class 
member notice of her share of the fund using the contact information 
contained in the CAT.167 Similar to the market automation approach 
discussed previously,168 the class members would then have an 
opportunity to opt out of the class action. If they did nothing, however, 
they would automatically receive their pro rata shares of the settlement 
fund.  
 
Sheets, . . . leading to suppression of reportable trades, incomplete reporting and inaccurate 
values”). This critique was repeated to me in interviews with current and past SEC officials, and 
SEC and FINRA have brought several actions over the past five years against banks and brokers 
who have not maintained accurate blue sheet data. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC: Citigroup Provided Incomplete Blue Sheet Data For 15 Years (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-138.html [https://perma.cc/SX6J-LNVD] (imposing a 
$7 million penalty on Citigroup and listing fines against other companies that similarly 
maintained inaccurate blue sheet data).  
 166. I confirmed this point with a past SEC employee as well as claims administrators. 
According to the claims administrators, they have occasionally been given blue sheet data when 
assisting with distribution of Fair Funds settlements, but they do not have access to it in private 
securities class actions. Even in the Fair Funds cases, however, the SEC instructs the claims 
administrators only to use this data as a starting point. In other words, the claims administrators 
can send claim forms to investors identified in the blue sheet data, but upon receipt of these forms, 
the investors must still fill them out and send the claims administrators documentation of their 
trades. As a result, the settlements are still opt-in.  
 167. One concern with such notice is that the bank or broker’s contact information may not 
always be accurate, especially if the settlement occurs several years after the relevant 
transactions. Investors may have moved; others may have closed or transferred their accounts. 
Nonetheless, even if this automated process does not work one hundred percent of the time, it will 
still significantly increase the percentage of class members who receive their share of settlement 
funds.  
 168. See supra Section II.A. 
Erickson_PAGE 11/16/2019 11:59 AM 
1858 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1817 
This approach would require the SEC to address how more 
complex forms of share ownership should be handled in the claims 
administration process. The current process of distributing settlement 
funds assumes that each class member controls her own shares, 
including the voting and economic rights associated with those shares. 
Today, however, the bundle of rights associated with share ownership 
can be split among multiple investors. For example, investors can 
purchase the voting rights of shares, but not the economic rights.169 
They can also engage in share lending and borrowing, as well as 
hedging transactions that reduce their financial risk in a given 
security.170  
These new forms of share ownership raise difficult questions 
when it comes to the claims administration process. If an investor has 
lent stock to someone else, is the lender or the borrower entitled to the 
pro rata share of the settlement fund associated with this stock? Who 
decides whether the shares should opt out of the settlement? Similarly, 
if the investor has entered into hedging transactions that reduced her 
economic risk during the class period, should these transactions reduce 
her recovery in the class action? The claims administration industry 
has generally been able to avoid these questions because investors with 
such complex forms of investments tend not to file claims in securities 
class actions. However, in my conversations with claims 
administrators, one stated that the claims administration industry is 
just “whistling by the graveyard” with respect to these questions but 
will have to confront them eventually. If the SEC allows claims 
administrators to use CAT data, this day could come sooner rather than 
later.  
Ultimately, the technological piece of this proposal would not be 
difficult. Although the CAT involves vast amounts of data, it would be 
relatively easy for the SEC to identify the data needed in a particular 
securities class action settlement and provide this data to the claims 
administrator. The claims administrators will have to decide how to 
handle more complex forms of stock ownership, but they will have to 
confront these issues sooner or later either way. The hard part, as we 
will see, is convincing the SEC that it should use CAT data in this way.  
 
 169. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006) (stating that “[t]here are a 
number of ways to decouple votes from economic ownership”); Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 778 (2005) (“Parties instead routinely utilize 
financial derivatives and structured finance techniques to reallocate various interests in the firm, 
including both residual claims and voting rights.”). 
 170. Martin & Partnoy, supra note 169. 
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2. Incentives in SEC Regulation 
The main impediment to this proposal is not the technology; it 
is the SEC. Although the SEC has not publicly commented on the use 
of CAT data in securities class actions, they are unlikely to support this 
proposal. As discussed above, the original purpose of the CAT is to allow 
regulators to identify and investigate illegal activities and to improve 
their analysis of market activities, especially those occurring on the 
dark web.171 These goals are ambitious from a regulatory perspective, 
but they are also narrowly tailored to the SEC’s investigative mission. 
The SEC has not approved use of CAT data for other purposes. 
Even with its relatively narrow goals, however, the SEC has 
faced significant pushback on its plans to develop the CAT. Banks and 
brokers have protested that the CAT data will not be secure enough to 
protect their customer data and their proprietary trading platforms.172 
Indeed, these concerns, combined with the technological complexity of 
the CAT’s reporting requirements, have now delayed the CAT launch 
by more than a year.173 As a result, the SEC has resisted any effort to 
use CAT data in additional ways. 
Yet the SEC has also indicated that it might be open to 
additional uses of the CAT in the future. In promulgating the initial 
rule authorizing creation of the CAT, for example, the SEC “requested 
comment on whether it should allow the Consolidated Audit Trail data 
to be made available to third parties, such as for academic research.”174 
After evaluating the feedback, however, the SEC determined that 
“because the creation and implementation of the Consolidated Audit 
Trail is in the formative stage, and in light of commenters’ concerns 
about the privacy and security of the information, the Commission 
believes it is premature to require that the NMS plan require the 
 
 171. See Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67,457, 104 SEC Docket 748 
(July 18, 2012). 
 172. See, e.g., Declan Harty, Wall Street Still Worries SEC’s Massive Trading Database Could 
Be Hacked, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 14, 2018, 12:17 PM), 
https://platform.mi.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=47923578&cdid=A-
47923578-10282 [https://perma.cc/YQ53-U5G9] (stating that the CAT is “a holy grail for hackers” 
and “Wall Street is not yet satisfied with the security of a massive SEC trading database set to 
begin collecting investor data in the coming days”); see also Hal Scott & John Gulliver, The SEC 
Plans to Collect Too Much Information, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-plans-to-collect-too-much-information-1506983751 
[https://perma.cc/5HEK-P79X] (“[A] breach could still be catastrophic. Broker-dealers would surely 
pull back from trading in response to the news that their proprietary trading strategies were no 
longer secure. The resulting volatility could require an indefinite marketwide shut down. That 
would deal an irreparable reputational blow to our markets.”). 
 173. See Redfearn, supra note 161 (describing the delays in the rollout of the CAT). 
 174. Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67,457, supra note 171, at 102. 
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provision of data to third parties.”175 In my own conversations with SEC 
staff, they stated that the CAT data might be used for additional 
purposes in the future, but that they need to get it up and running 
before they are willing to consider any additional uses.  
The relevant rules and guidelines on the books do not prohibit 
the SEC from using CAT data in this way. Rule 613 provides that the 
SEC shall only have access to the CAT “for the purpose of performing 
its respective regulatory and oversight responsibilities pursuant to the 
federal securities laws, rules, and regulations.”176 The SEC’s regulatory 
and oversight responsibilities include protecting investors injured by 
fraud. The SEC’s Division of Enforcement, for example, has stated that 
one of its core principles includes “impos[ing] remedies that most 
effectively further enforcement goals,” including “returning funds to 
harmed investors.”177 The SEC has also frequently lauded the 
importance of securities class actions in promoting these goals.178 It 
would be somewhat odd if the SEC uses this new treasure trove of data 
only to catch investors engaged in illegal activity and not also to help 
law-abiding investors injured by others’ misconduct. 
The SEC could take a step in this direction by using CAT data 
to distribute settlement funds in its own enforcement actions. The SEC 
frequently imposes financial penalties on defendants in its enforcement 
proceedings. It also orders defendants to disgorge any ill-gotten 
gains.179 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 allows the SEC to place this 
money into a Fair Fund for distribution to investors.180 Since 2002, the 
SEC has distributed billions of dollars to investors through its Fair 
 
 175. Id. at 103. 
 176. 17 C.F.R. § 242.613(e)(2) (2019) (emphasis added). The CAT NMS Plan, which establishes 
detailed guidelines for the development and use of the CAT, similarly provides that the 
Commission shall have access to the CAT data “solely for the purpose of performing such Person’s 
regulatory and oversight responsibilities pursuant to the federal securities laws, rules, and 
regulations or any contractual obligations.” CAT NMS Plan, supra note 150, at § 6.1(u).  
 177. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 4, 11 (2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8WS-45YL]. 
 178. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keeping 
Shareholders on the Beat: A Call for a Considered Conversation About Mandatory Arbitration 
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/jackson-shareholders-conversation-about-
mandatory-arbitration-022618 [https://perma.cc/S5WS-8733] (“My colleagues in the Division of 
Enforcement do invaluable work every day protecting investors. But there are limits to what they 
can do . . . . So it comes as no surprise to me that shareholders are now working harder than ever 
to enforce our securities laws.”). 
 179. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 16 
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-agency-financial-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VP2-
GCKX] (stating that, in fiscal year 2017 alone, “the SEC obtained judgments and orders for over 
$3.8 billion in penalties and disgorgement”).  
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.1100 (2019) (authorizing the creation 
of funds from disgorgement payments for the benefit of harmed investors). 
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Funds program.181 Annually, the amount of money that the SEC 
distributes to investors through this program is larger than the 
agency’s entire budget.182  
Yet the SEC typically uses the same claims process used in 
securities class actions to distribute this money.183 The SEC has not 
released data on the percentage of eligible investors who typically 
submit claims. It is fair to assume, however, that the same process that 
has such glaring problems in the securities class action context causes 
similar problems in Fair Funds cases.  
The SEC could streamline this process by using CAT data to 
identify injured investors who are eligible for compensation from Fair 
Funds. As discussed above, the CAT includes all of the information 
necessary to calculate individual investors’ losses and send them their 
shares of the settlement. The SEC could share the precise information 
needed for the claims distribution process with the claims 
administrator for the Fair Funds distribution. Alternatively, if the SEC 
does not want to share this sensitive data with an outside company, it 
could run the claims distribution process itself. If this process works 
effectively and an increased number of investors receive their share of 
the Fair Funds, perhaps the SEC will be motivated to expand the use 
of the CAT data into private securities class actions.  
III. THE COMPLEXITIES OF AUTOMATION 
The legal system has long struggled to distribute settlement 
funds in securities class actions to investors injured by fraud. But this 
problem has a simple solution—give claims administrators access to the 
data they need to automate the process. Banks and brokers have data 
on their own customers’ transactions, and the CAT will soon have data 
on all securities transactions. If claims administrators had access to the 
relevant data from either of these sources, more shareholders would 
receive their shares of the settlement funds and no class member would 
have to go through the cumbersome process of submitting a claim.  
 
 181. See Velikonja, supra note 112, at 332–33 (“Since 2002, the SEC has deposited $14.46 
billion for defrauded investors into 243 distribution funds.”). 
 182. See id. 
 183. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.1101(b)(6) (2019), which provides that a plan for distributing a Fair 
Fund must include, among other things: 
Procedures for the administration of the fund, including selection, compensation, and, 
as necessary, indemnification of a fund administrator to oversee the fund, process 
claims, prepare accountings, file tax returns, and, subject to the approval of the 
Commission, make distributions from the fund to investors who were harmed by the 
violation.  
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However, there are three possible complexities to using this data 
to automate the claims administration process, which this final Part 
will outline. First, it describes the likely reaction of lead plaintiffs and 
other large institutional investors who currently participate in these 
suits. Second, it lays out the steps that the legal system would need to 
take to guard against fraud. Finally, it outlines data security concerns 
that will likely arise if claims administrators receive access to detailed 
transaction data. Taken together, these complications mean that claims 
administrators and lawmakers should tread carefully when it comes to 
automating the claims administration process.  
A. Lead Plaintiffs and Opt-Outs 
Automating the distribution of settlement funds could have a 
dramatic impact on some investors’ willingness to participate in 
securities class actions. Section II.A described how automation would 
likely reduce the money that many institutional investors currently 
receive from securities class action settlements.184 To briefly repeat this 
point, under the current approach, settlement funds are still being 
distributed, just to a smaller pool of investors—the approximately 
thirty or forty percent of class members who file a claim.185 If courts 
automate the distribution of these settlement funds, the same amount 
of money will be distributed among nearly one hundred percent of class 
members. As a result, automation will help those who do not currently 
receive their share of the fund, but it will hurt those who have 
traditionally filed claims.186 
In Part II, this point helped explain why many institutional 
investors would not push for automation. Yet the impact of these 
changes on institutional investors could also affect their willingness to 
participate in these suits more generally. One study found that the 
primary factor in an institutional investor’s decision to serve as lead 
plaintiff is the size of its loss and the corresponding size of the potential 
litigation recovery.187 The study concluded that “[f]unds are concerned 
with the bottom line in pursuing litigation activism.”188 Institutional 
investors may lose interest in serving as lead plaintiff if their recovery 
 
 184. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 185. See supra Section I.B. 
 186. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 450 (“By letting billions slip through their fingers, 
institutions essentially enhance the amounts recovered by those investors who present their 
claims. That is, their slumbering actually enhances the compensatory quality of securities class 
actions for those who do file claims.”). 
 187. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing 
Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 340 (2008). 
 188. Id. 
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shrinks significantly. If institutional investors become less likely to lead 
these lawsuits, many law firms could again rely on smaller investors to 
serve as lead plaintiff, which could reduce the institutional monitoring 
that Congress thought it was getting with the PSLRA.  
Automation could also prompt some institutional investors to 
opt out of securities class actions altogether. As outlined in Part I, 
securities class actions are opt-out class actions, which means that 
individuals who fall within the class definition are still free to opt out 
of the class action and file their own individual lawsuits.189 A study of 
opt-out rates by Cornerstone Research found that approximately three 
percent of securities class actions filed between 1996 and 2014 included 
at least one investor that excluded itself from the class to pursue a 
separate lawsuit.190 An earlier study also found that the most 
significant “predictor of opt-outs is the dollar amount recovered per 
class member.”191 In other words, investors are more likely to file their 
own lawsuit if they think that they will end up with significantly more 
money from an individual lawsuit than if they stay in the class action. 
If automation dramatically increases the number of shareholders who 
share in the settlement fund, large institutional investors could see 
their recovery from these suits fall significantly, prompting an 
increased number of opt-outs. 
Of course, not all institutional investors would stop participating 
in securities class actions. The Cox and Thomas study found that even 
the largest institutional investors are not very good at filing claims in 
these lawsuits,192 so many will likely welcome a streamlined process to 
receive their share of settlement funds. Still, those institutional 
investors who already participate in class actions and receive their 
share of settlement funds may decide that they can make more money 
by filing their own individual lawsuits.  
It is difficult to predict the impact of such an exodus. On one 
hand, it could hurt class actions because institutional investors have 
 
 189. See supra Section I.A. 
 190. See AMIR ROZEN ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, OPT-OUT CASES IN SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2012–2014 UPDATE 2 (2016).  
 191. Id.; see also Choi & Fisch, supra note 187, at 332 (“Funds appear to believe that they will 
recover more money and receive payment more quickly when they opt out.”); Jeffrey Paul 
Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Inst. Inv’rs, Navigating Alternatives to Securities Fraud Class 
Actions: State Law and Opt-Out Litigation, Remarks Before the Institute for Investor Protection 
Conference (Oct. 24, 2014), in 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 459, 463–64 (2015) (“In general, it appears that 
the more material the amount of the estimated claim or damage is to the fund’s assets under 
management, the more likely the fund will conclude that overall benefits of opting out exceed the 
costs to the fund, including the costs for extra time and resources often associated with pursuing 
an opt-out action.”). 
 192. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 421–25 (“[O]n average, roughly 28% of eligible 
institutional investors file claims in these settlements.”). 
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long been associated with better case outcomes and lower attorneys’ 
fees.193 If they start filing their own lawsuits, securities class actions 
could fall back into the hands of smaller, individual investors, which 
could reduce the quality of the suits.194 At the same time, however, it is 
also possible that increased opt-outs could lead to greater overall 
recovery for shareholders, which could increase the deterrent effects of 
these suits. In short, changing settlement practices will have ripple 
effects, but it is impossible to predict their exact impact.195 This does 
not mean that the legal system should cling to an antiquated system. 
Instead, judges and lawmakers should be attentive to these ripple 
effects to ensure that securities class actions function effectively.  
B. Risk of Fraud 
Claims administrators will also have to be on the lookout to 
prevent efforts to defraud the settlement process. Securities class action 
settlements are a multibillion-dollar business, and any changes to a 
system that involves this much money is likely to spark new efforts to 
get undeserved windfalls.  
This is not a new concern in the claims administration business. 
Claims administrators have often had to adapt their methods to prevent 
fraud,196 and they have spoken publicly about how the use of technology 
can increase the risk of fraud in this industry. As one example, in 2017, 
various app distributors agreed to pay $5.3 million to settle claims that 
 
 193. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Lead Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers: Mission 
Accomplished or More to be Done?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 271 
(Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (surveying the empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
institutional investors on securities class actions).  
 194. Alternatively, law firms may do even more to entice institutional investors to serve as 
lead plaintiffs, complicating an already ethically fraught market for institutional investor clients. 
See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Frequent Filers: The Problems of Shareholder Lawsuits and the 
Path to Reform, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 10 (2014), 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Frequent_Filers_Final_Version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JN3W-4V39] (noting that law firms have made campaign contributions to the 
directors of public funds in order to be named lead counsel); Coffee, supra note 20, at 310–11 (2010) 
(“ ‘[P]ay-to-play’ practices began to develop, because for the first time plaintiffs’ law firms saw a 
reason to make political contributions to officials who controlled or at least influenced public 
pension funds.”). 
 195. One possible approach is to permit greater incentive awards in securities class actions. 
Richard A. Nagareda, Restitution, Rent Extraction, and Class Representatives: Implications of 
Incentive Awards, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2006) (arguing that the PSLRA’s restrictions on 
compensating lead plaintiffs is “odd” considering the fact that “other features of that legislation 
proceed upon—indeed, enshrine—the notion of high-quality monitoring by large institutional 
investors as class representatives”). 
 196. See, e.g., Securities Class Action Cases, HEFFLER CLAIMS GROUP 
https://www.hefflerclaims.com/securities/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/23NM-
VJBS] (“Heffler uses advanced fraud control processes in the administration of all securities class 
action settlements to reduce fraudulent claims and fraudulent distribution checks.”). 
Erickson_PAGE 11/16/2019 11:59 AM 
2019] AUTOMATING SECURITIES CLASS SETTLEMENTS 1865 
they had improperly accessed data stored on Apple devices.197 The 
settlement claims administrator, KCC Class Action Services, agreed to 
email notice of the settlement and instructions for filing claims to 
thirteen million potential class members whose contact information it 
received from the defendants.198 It also agreed to publish this same 
information on Twitter.199 In all, approximately ninety-one thousand 
claims were filed, including more than forty-six thousand claims that 
could be traced back to the Twitter announcement.200 KCC later told 
the court that Twitter doubled the claims rate for the settlement,201 
reflecting the power of technology in this space. 
Yet KCC also found that technology dramatically increased the 
rate of fraudulent claims. In an affidavit filed with the court, KCC 
detailed approximately six thousand Twitter-originated claims filed by 
bots that appeared to be fraudulent.202 Approximately 5,400 of these 
suspicious claims were submitted from the same IP address, and nearly 
one thousand of the claims were from people who purported to live in 
the same single-family home in Toledo, Ohio.203 This revelation 
prompted the judge to refer the suspicious claims to the local U.S. 
Attorneys’ office for investigation.204 A class action notice expert told 
Reuters News that he is worried that claims administrators, which are 
facing significant market pressure, “don’t have the resources to keep up 
with the bots” in cases like these. “We’ve created a very difficult 
challenge,” he observed. “The risk is great that we’re not catching 
this.”205 
It is difficult to predict exactly how automation would affect the 
risk of fraud in securities class actions. On one hand, automation would 
likely eliminate at least some fraudulent practices. Right now, 
individual investors file claims by sending in documentation of their 
 
 197. Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action 
Settlement; Memorandum of Points & Authorities at 9, Opperman v. Path, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00453-
JST (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017). 
 198. See id. at 8–9 (requiring Defendants to provide the settlement administrator with a list 
of settlement class members so that the settlement administrator can provide notice through 
email). 
 199. Id. at 9. 
 200. Declaration of Lana Lucchesi in Support of Administrative Motion para. 3, Opperman v. 
Kong Techs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00453-JST (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2017). 
 201. Alison Frankel, The Class Action Claim Bots are Coming! (Actually, They’re Already 
Here), REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-bots/the-class-
action-claim-bots-are-coming-idUSKBN1F7331 [https://perma.cc/XU3B-TDZ9]. 
 202. Declaration of Lana Lucchesi in Support of Administrative Motion, supra note 200, para. 
3. 
 203. Id. para. 5. 
 204. Frankel, supra note 201. 
 205. Id. 
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alleged trades during the class period.206 This documentation can be 
falsified, and it is difficult for claims administrators to catch such 
falsification unless they individually verify every claim with banks and 
brokers, a process that is cost prohibitive. Automating claims 
administration would address this concern because claims 
administrators would receive transaction data directly from the banks 
and brokers, and therefore individual investors would not have an 
opportunity to submit fraudulent transaction data.  
Just as automation would eliminate some fraudulent practices, 
however, it would likely spark new ones as well. Any market 
innovation, especially one that involves billions of dollars, brings out 
those eager to exploit it. On a small scale, it could be hard to identify 
those who should be excluded from the class, including family members 
of the defendants or entities affiliated with them.207 On a larger scale, 
fraudsters could partner with those working inside the banks and 
brokers to falsify transaction data. While it may be impossible to predict 
the exact fraud, the rise of the internet has shown that people are ever 
creative in finding new ways to exploit one another.  
Claims administrators, in conjunction with courts, could take 
steps to prevent fraudulent claims. To prevent smaller-scale frauds, 
they could require defendants to provide a list of immediate relatives 
and other household members, as well as the entities with which they 
are affiliated.208 To prevent larger frauds, claims administrators should 
consider additional steps to verify larger claims. For example, the 
claims administrator could flag all claims over $250,000. The 
administrator would pay claims under this amount automatically. For 
claims over this amount, however, the administrator would send letters 
to the class member and the brokerage house, informing them of their 
estimated share of the settlement fund and inviting them to submit 
supporting documentation to receive this amount. If the class members 
do not submit this additional documentation, they will not receive their 
shares of the settlement. Claims administrators could take similar 
steps with any other claims that raise similar red flags.  
 
 206. See supra Section I.B.1.a (describing the traditional claims administration process). 
 207. See, e.g., Declaration of Jacob A. Goldberg in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Unopposed 
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at Ex. A (Stipulation and Agreement 
of Settlement), In re Tangoe, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00146-VLB (D. Conn. Oct. 3, 2017) (defining the 
“Settlement Class” to exclude these individuals and entities); Stipulation of Settlement para. 1.31, 
Harr v. Ampio Pharm., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-03474-TJH-PJW (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2017) (same).  
 208. Claims administrators can also be on the lookout for class members with different names 
or accounts but with the same addresses or other relevant information to ensure that they are 
accurately calculating net sales during the class period.  
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C. Concerns About Data Security  
One final impediment in automating the claims administration 
process is concern about data security. Banks and brokers will likely be 
quite reluctant to hand over proprietary client transaction data to 
claims administrators. These institutions would worry about what 
would happen to their clients and their relationships with those clients 
if the data was hacked or leaked, and these concerns are justified, 
especially in light of the recent hack of the SEC’s Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) database.209 
Accordingly, any efforts to overhaul the claims administration process 
will have to come with stringent data security guidelines.  
These guidelines should come from data security professionals, 
not lawyers. The goal of this Section is therefore not to spell out detailed 
security requirements that claims administration companies should 
follow. Instead, it is to stress that courts should not approve any 
automation plan that does not include appropriate data security 
measures. The premise of all securities class actions is that class 
members have already been defrauded in some way. It would be 
inexcusable, and more than a little ironic, if the lawsuit intended to 
compensate them for this harm led to them being defrauded again.  
At the same time, there is reason to believe that many claims 
administration companies are capable of implementing appropriate 
data security measures. These companies are already thinking about 
data security, so these guidelines will not be entirely new to the 
industry. Nearly every claims administration company already has 
data security policies that it touts on its website. As one example, Epiq, 
which is one of the largest claims administration firms in the country, 
states on its website that it has a “multi-layered security program” to 
protect its clients’ data that includes intrusion detection system (“IDS”) 
technology with application and network firewalls, comprehensive anti-
malware solutions, and a security event and incident management 
(“SEIM”) deployment plan.210 It also maintains a full-time staff of 
certified information security professionals to manage its security 
program and to run regular audits and risk assessments.211 Similarly, 
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A.B. Data, another well-known claims administrator, states that it “is 
frequently subjected to physical, logical, data and information systems 
securities reviews and audits. We are compliant with our clients’ 
security standards, as well as ISO/IEC 27001/2 and Payment Card 
Industry (PCI) data security standards; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) 
Act of 1999; [and other private and statutory standards].”212 Data 
security is part of nearly every aspect of the financial services industry, 
and the claims administration process is no different. Courts should 
obviously still ask hard questions before expanding these companies’ 
access to sensitive financial data, but the good news is that companies 
are already thinking about these issues.  
Moreover, claims administration companies already have a 
significant amount of sensitive data. Under current practices, courts 
require banks and brokers to turn over a list of their clients who 
transacted in the relevant securities during the class period, along with 
these clients’ contact information.213 The class members who choose to 
file a claim then detail their specific transactions, along with supporting 
documentation that includes sensitive account and other financial 
information. Automation expands the volume of data that these 
companies will have, but it does not change the nature of the data itself. 
Accordingly, if claims administrators do not have the necessary data 
security protocols to automate this process, then they should not have 
access to the information they already use in the claims administration 
process. In short, data security should be a crucial part of settlement 
claims administration regardless of whether the process is automated.  
CONCLUSION 
Securities class actions purport to be opt-out lawsuits, but they 
are not. To get any benefit from the litigation, class members must opt 
into a cumbersome claims process in which they are required to 
document their transactions and detail their losses. Faced with these 
hurdles, many class members never claim their share of the settlement. 
This Article outlines two approaches to modernize the settlement 
process. The first approach relies on market innovation, suggesting that 
claims administrators create an automated system that collects the 
relevant transaction data information from individual banks and 
brokers and uses this data to calculate and distribute each class 
member’s pro rata share of the settlement. The second approach would 
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use the SEC’s new Consolidated Audit Trail to identify potential class 
members and calculate their recovery. Both approaches would require 
the cooperation of lawmakers to make these lawsuits truly opt-out. 
These proposals also open the door to considering broader 
changes to how settlement funds are distributed across the legal 
system. Securities class actions are an obvious starting point, given the 
low claims rates that have been documented in this area. If distribution 
of these settlements is automated, however, it might then be possible to 
use a similar approach in other types of corporate and securities 
litigation. The SEC, for example, typically uses the same methods used 
in securities class actions to distribute its Fair Funds recoveries, and 
shareholders also use similar methods in corporate lawsuits filed under 
state law. Reforming the claims administration process in securities 
class actions could pave the way for changes across the board, 
revolutionizing the way that investors recover money lost to corporate 
fraud.  
 
